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ANTI-WASTE
Michael Pappas *
Abstract
It may be a bad idea to waste resources, but is it illegal? Legally
speaking, what does “waste” even mean? Though the concept may appear
completely subjective, this Article builds a framework for understanding
how the law identifies and addresses waste.
Drawing upon property and natural resource doctrines, the Article
finds that the law selects from a menu of five specific, and sometimes
competing, societal values to define waste. The values are: 1) economic
efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future generations, 4)
stability and consistency, and 5) ecological concerns. The law recognizes
waste in terms of one or a combination of these values.
After identifying waste, the law seeks to eliminate it via targeted
anti-waste provisions, which follow one of three approaches. First, “usageveto” measures empower selected parties to halt perceived wasteful
changes to resource uses. Second, “market-facilitating” measures prevent
economic waste by encouraging and correcting markets. Third,
“sustainability” measures proscribe wasteful overconsumption of resources
fundamental to human and ecosystem flourishing.
Through this framework, the Article synthesizes seemingly disparate
property and resource doctrines into a coherent legal approach to the idea
of waste. This overarching understanding of legal waste explains how
individual anti-waste provisions originate and operate. Further, the waste
framework serves as a practical tool for analyzing whether anti-waste laws
remain in touch with current resource contexts and societal preferences.
Finally, it offers theoretical insight about how anti-waste provisions work
cumulatively to inject a necessary adaptability into property law.
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I. PROPERTY AND THE CONTESTED CONCEPT OF WASTE ................... 5
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INTRODUCTION
We all know one thing about waste: it is bad. 1 It is hard to find the
individual generally in favor of wasting something. 2 Beyond that, however,
opinions begin to diverge about what constitutes waste, and the term
“waste” becomes difficult to define. Depending on the factual context or
one’s values, the same action may or may not be considered waste.
Consider the example of an apple tree. Letting apples fall from the
tree unharvested may be waste to some. Using the apples as decoration
rather than eating them or donating them to the hungry may be waste in
another sense. Allowing people to pick from the tree for free instead of
selling the apples is a different form of waste. Alternatively, allowing the
tree to remain instead of planting a different crop, say wine-grapes, could be
waste in a sense. Even maintaining the tree instead of cutting it to make way
for a highway or shopping mall may be waste to another. Then again, none
of the above necessarily constitutes waste.
Variations of waste abound, and to indulge one more example, Marc
1

See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right To Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 91 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
(“[E]verybody knows that waste is bad; this is, in fact, largely what the word means”).
2
See id. at 76 (“Anglo-American society has never liked waste, in moral or
consequential terms . . .”).
IN THE
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Reisner recounts a memorable instance in his western-water classic,
Cadillac Desert:
"You're from the Park Service, aren't you?" Mulholland demanded
more than asked.
"Yes, I am," said Albright. "Why do you ask?"
"Why?" Mulholland said archly. "Why? I'll tell you why. You have
a beautiful park up north. A majestic park. Yosemite Park, it's called. You've
been there, have you?"
Albright said he had. He was the park's superintendent.
"Well, I'm going to tell you what I'd do with your park. Do you want
to know what I would do?"
Albright said he did.
"Well, I'll tell you. You know this new photographic process they've
invented? It's called Pathe. It makes everything seem life like. The hues and
coloration are magnificent. Well, then, what I would do, if I were custodian
of your park, is I'd hire a dozen of the best photographers in the world. I'd
build them cabins in Yosemite Valley and pay them something and give them
all the film they wanted. I'd say, "This park is yours. It's yours for one year. I
want you to take photographs in every season. I want you to capture all the
colors, all the waterfalls, all the snow, and all the majesty. I especially want
you to photograph the rivers. In the early summer, when the Merced River
roars, I want to see that.' And then I'd leave them be. And in a year I'd come
back and take their film, and send it out and have it developed and treated by
Pathe. And then I would print the pictures in thousands of books and send
them to every library. I would urge every magazine in the country to print
them and tell every gallery and museum to hang them. I would make certain
that every American saw them. And then,” Mulholland said slowly, with what
Albright remembered as a vulpine grin, “and then do you want [to know what]
I would do? I'd go in there and build a dam from one side of that valley to the
other and stop the goddamned waste!" 3

Mulholland’s view may seem outdated, even repugnant, to some but
rational or possibly morally mandated to others, and there can be such
vehement difference of opinion over the principle of waste because the idea
has no ethically neutral definition. It is an essentially contested concept that
varies by individual.
Identifying waste is not solely an individual enterprise, though. In
fact, through its entire history American law has attempted to define and
eliminate waste. From common law to statute and across a number of
different contexts, our legal system has wrangled with sorting out what is
waste and how best to prevent it.
One might call these attempts to define and deal with waste “antiwaste” measures, and they are the focus of this Article. Though anti-waste
3

MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT, 91-92 (Penguin 1993) (emphasis added).
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measures offer insight into both property theory and practical resource
management, scholarship has yet to consider our various anti-waste
doctrines collectively or holistically. While legal concepts of waste have
intrigued scholars since the days of Blackstone, 4 the existing literature tends
to address only select doctrines in relative isolation. For example, the
common-law property doctrine of “waste” (hereinafter referred to as
“landlord-tenant waste” 5) has received most of the attention, and notable
scholars such as Thomas Merrill, Richard Posner, and Jed Purdy have
examined it. 6 Addressing a different facet of waste, Edward McCaffery has
explored how the concept of wasteful expenditures fits into notions of
property and how taxation might address such waste. 7 Finally, Joseph Sax
and Lior Strahelivitz have discussed different sides of the waste coin by
addressing, respectively, protections for culturally important property and
owners’ rights to destroy property. 8
Building from the existing scholarship, this Article broadens the
discussion of waste and anti-waste laws. It looks at legally cognizable waste
more globally, and it considers anti-waste measures across the spectrum of
property and natural resources law, seeking an overarching understanding
of how the law identifies and addresses waste. 9 Additionally, by assembling
and synthesizing anti-waste measures, this Article challenges assumptions
that property law is reluctant or unable to deal with waste. 10
4

See, e.g., John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MISSOURI
L. REV. 1209, 1209 (2007).
5
The doctrine is commonly referred to simply as “the law of waste.” See, e.g., Thomas
W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in American Property
Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2011). However, since some distinguishing label is
necessary to differentiate this particular waste doctrine from the other concepts of waste
discussed, this Article will use landlord-tenant waste despite the fact that this is not a
widely accepted name for the doctrine.
6
See id.; Richard A. Posner, Comment on Merrill on the Law of Waste, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 1095 (2011); Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A
Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006).
7
See generally McCaffery, supra note 1
8
See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy,
117 YALE L. J. 781 (2005).
9
This Article does not limit its consideration of anti-waste provisions only to those
doctrines that explicitly use the term “waste.” Rather, it considers how the law identifies
and addresses concepts of waste, regardless of whether the term is used. See discussion
infra Part II. While a survey of the use of the term “waste” throughout American
jurisprudence would also be valuable, that is a project for another article.
10
For example, Edward McCaffery suggests that the law essentially does not address
“non-urgent” waste, such as seemingly poor choices to spend resources on economicallydesirable but non-essential ends (e.g. luxury goods instead of pressing needs). See
McCaffery, supra note 1 at 86, 89. He is not alone in this regard. See, e.g., Larissa Katz,
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the contested
concept of waste and its interplay with property principles. Next, Part II
asserts that the law recognizes waste based on examining two factors:
perceived resource context (i.e. whether a resource is perceived as over- or
under-used) and specific societal values. To identify waste, the law first
acknowledges a perception of resource over- or under-use. Next, the law
adopts one or more of the following (sometimes competing) values: 1)
economic efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future
generations, 4) stability and consistency, and 5) ecological concerns. The
law then defines waste by applying the chosen value (or combination of
values) to the perceived resource context. This framework of adopting
societal values from a specific menu and applying the values to a perceived
resource context offers an overarching understanding of how the law
identifies legally cognizable waste. Part III adds to this framework by
explaining how anti-waste provisions develop in response to instances of
legally cognizable waste and operate to address them. Examining a broad
array of property and natural resource doctrines, this Part finds anti-waste
provisions are not scattered, divergent, ad hoc policies. Rather, approaches
to combatting waste fall consistently into three categories: usage vetoes,
market-facilitating measures, and sustainability measures. Usage-veto
provisions empower selected parties to halt perceived wasteful changes to
resource uses; market-facilitating measures prevent economic waste by
encouraging and correcting markets; and sustainability measures proscribe
wasteful overconsumption of resources fundamental to human and
ecosystem flourishing. Finally, Part IV explores the theoretical and practical
implications of this waste framework. It suggests that the adaptable concept
of waste brings responsive agility to the otherwise ponderous realm of
property doctrines, allowing resource management regimes to keep in step
with changing resource perceptions and societal values. It then deploys the
waste framework as a tool for evaluating individual anti-waste measures as
well as for informing broader property concepts.
I.

PROPERTY AND THE CONTESTED CONCEPT OF WASTE
Autonomy figures centrally into concepts of property ownership. 11

Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J.
1444, 1448 (2013) (“While the law might prohibit certain uses of property, the story goes,
it has no business scrutinizing an owner's reasons for choosing among otherwise permitted
uses.”). However, Parts II.B.2 and III.C of this Article offer instances of the law
intervening to police this very concept of waste.
11
See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO
L.J. 275, 311 (2008) (“freedom is the key justificatory reason for ownership”); Henry E.
Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American
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Thus interests in property or resources can be described as “bundles of
sticks” that typically include not only the right to exclude others but also the
right to use (or not use) property. 12 As the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas instructs, generally one must not use property in such a way as
to injure the lawful rights of one’s neighbors, 13 but beyond that our laws
leave a property owner great latitude. Latitude so great, in fact, that
throughout the history of Roman, English, and American law, property
owners’ rights included even the right to destroy property. 14 As Larissa
Katz has put it, “[o]wnership's defining characteristic is that it is the special
authority to set the agenda for a resource.” 15
For the most part, a property owner’s latitude in using his or her
property does not cause concern about too much destruction of property or
about resources not being used in valuable ways. Self-interest typically
drives property owners to use resources in societally desirable ways and to
forego exercising their rights to destroy or leave unused valuable property.16
Thus, for the most part the law takes a laissez faire approach, compelling no
particular use of property or resources. 17 To take the example of a privately
owned wilderness, “[p]roperty law is seen as essentially neutral, neither
encouraging nor discouraging wilderness destruction, except in the limited
sense of facilitating owner autonomy.” 18 Thus, “[p]roperty law is primarily
concerned not with what so-and-so may or may not do with Blackacre, but
with who decides what so-and-so may do.” 19
However, in some limited instances property law’s laisez-faire
approach causes concern, particularly when it leads to “waste” of

Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964 (2009) (“the owner usually can use the
property for a variety of uses without answering to outsiders.”).
12
See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 16 (2d ed., 2012)
13
See, e.g., 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 89
14
See Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 787-88; McCaffery, supra note 1 at 76; Katz, supra
note 11 at 313.
15
Katz, supra note 11 at 290. See also Katz, supra note 10 at 1450 (“Owners have the
standing to resolve what I will call the Basic Question: what (in their view) constitutes a
worthwhile use of a thing.”).
16
See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (Papers & Proc 1967).
17
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757,
798 (2009) (“the important, if often implicit, assumption in much of the literature on
property's role in incentives and allocation, [is] namely the utilitarian default that
preferences are value neutral.”)
18
John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 519, 520 (1996).
19
James Y. Stern, Property's Constitution, 101 CAL. L. REV. 277, 294 (2013)
(emphasis added).
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resources. 20 In some such instances, the law intervenes with anti-waste
measures that, to borrow Katz’s phrasing, 21 circumscribe the owner’s
special authority to set the agenda for a resource and steer resource use in a
particularly preferred (i.e. non-wasteful) direction. These laws may
originate at federal or state levels, may stem from common law or statute,
and may apply to a variety of different scenarios. Nonetheless, they all find
common purpose by seeking to avoid the specter of waste, however defined.
Attempts to prevent waste, though, inject a degree of chaos into
property laws. Instead of allowing property to organize around concepts of
autonomy or agenda-setting authority, 22 anti-waste laws introduce a new
guiding principle fraught with subjectivity. Waste is an essentially contested
concept, and navigating by it can lead to any number of endpoints.
For example, one of the more commonly held understandings of
waste stems from Locke’s concepts of divine justice and morality. 23 These
ideas of waste usually entail avoiding destruction or underuse of something
of value. By way of illustration, “under a Lockean conception of waste, it is
improper to kill a wild animal and then leave it to rot in the forest.” 24 This is
the case even if one owns the animal as property. From this Lockean
perspective, “waste refer[s] to the dissipation or destruction of a permanent
physical asset,” 25 and while self-interest normally prevents such actions,26
concern about this idea of waste persists, particularly in arguments for
curtailing property owners’ rights to destroy their property. 27
However, a more utilitarian conception of waste might find no
objection to the same behavior that Locke would condemn. Working with
the same illustrative example of killing a wild animal and leaving it to rot in
the forest, from a utilitarian perspective to kill a feral pig, because it might
20

Cf. Katz, supra note 10 at 1461 (“Ownership, unlike other positions of authority,
does not rely on the special expertise or unique suitability of a particular holder of a right to
make decisions affecting a thing”).
21
See Katz, supra note 11 at 290.
22
Autonomy has been seen as a principle and central aim of property law, which
protects the rights of relatively stable and predictable agenda-setter for a resource, namely,
the owner. See supra sources cited in note 11. Granted, “autonomy” itself is a malleable
concept. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75
(2010).
23
See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 285, 308 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1970) (1690) (“As
much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may
by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs
to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”).
24
Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 789.
25
McCaffery, supra note 1 at 77.
26
See, e.g., id.
27
See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 786, 820, 784.
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ravage cropland, 28 and to leave it to rot in the forest, because one does not
enjoy eating wild pig, would not necessarily constitute a form of waste.
From a similar perspective, one might criticize laws mandating preservation
of historic buildings (laws that some might view as preventing one form of
waste, i.e., the alteration of great architecture 29) as wasteful themselves in
the sense that they “can obscure the social waste that results from excessive
preservation or insufficient creation.” 30
Moreover, as one refines the utilitarian perspective with a more
economically oriented approach, the waste calculus might further change.
For example, to kill a feral pig to prevent crop damage and not eat it as a
matter of taste is fine, but given that some treat wild pig as a delicacy 31 and
are willing to pay for it, 32 then not at least retrieving and selling the pig
might constitute waste. 33 In such a case the failure to realize the gains from
trade between willing buyers and willing sellers results in a form of
economic waste. 34 Thus one might identify a “wasteful nonuse” through
“failing to exploit economic opportunities fully,” 35 or, more vernacularly, a
variation of waste embodying the idea that “one man’s trash is another
man’s treasure.”
Then again, the prospect of bringing the pig out of the woods and
trying to sell it might represent a “waste of time” for the hunter. To cast this
in economic terms, there is an opportunity cost in retrieving and selling the
pig, 36 and if the price for wild pig is not sufficiently high to preclude the
28

Many states have attempted to eradicate feral pigs for just this reason. See, e.g.,
$1M Pilot Project Aims to Take Out Feral Pigs, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1m-pilotproject-aims-take-out-feral-pigs.
29
See discussion infra Part III.A.
30
Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 821.
31
See,
e.g.,
Wild
Boar:
Time
to
Pig
Out,
http://westernfarmpress.com/management/feral-hog-income-opportunity-hunters-meatprocessors
32
See, e.g., Feral Hog Income Opportunity for Hunters, Meat Processors,
http://westernfarmpress.com/management/feral-hog-income-opportunity-hunters-meatprocessors
33
Id.
34
See, e.g., RICHARD IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 14 (Princeton 2005)
(“[T]rading can improve the welfare of all the participants to a trade. Owing to diminishing
marginal utility and the fact that individuals do not all have the same preferences for goods,
an arbitrary allocation of goods to individuals is usually not as good as the allocation that
individuals choose if given the opportunity to trade.”)
35
Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 792.
36
See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 121 (illustrating opportunity costs in terms of
going to a baseball game by noting that the out of pocket costs of attending a baseball game
are “ticket plus the costs of transportation and parking” while the opportunity cost of going
to the ballgame “is that you did not spend your money and time engaging in the next best
thing you could have done.”).
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hunter from spending her time doing something else, then the hunter is
worse off for not leaving the pig. From the hunter’s subjective standpoint, it
is a waste (i.e. not worth her time) to take any action but leave the pig to rot.
Moreover, since the market price of the pig would not be as high as the
price that the hunter puts on her time, then retrieving it would impose a
deadweight loss 37 and create an overall negative utility value—wasting the
hunter’s time and diminishing net societal wellbeing. 38
Conversely, from the standpoint of an individual without sufficient
food or a society concerned with food availability, the hunter’s leaving the
pig rather than taking some measure to add it to the food supply 39 might be
considered waste, regardless of the hunter’s subjective valuation of the cost
of her time. This view of waste eschews the subjective, endogenous
standpoint of the hunter 40 and instead focuses on external, exogenous
prioritization of resource uses. Thus, market-based valuation would not be
entirely relevant, and instead waste would be identified “as the relatively
nonurgent expenditure of scarce resources,” particularly on luxury, leisure,
or other non-essential items. 41 Such an approach to waste disapproves of
“frivolous, or excessive consumption [or] poor choices [from an external
viewpoint] of how to spend time or value.” 42 This concept of waste
downplays individual utility values and instead focuses on externally
imposed concepts of optimal resource use. 43 Thus, though the hunter may
subjectively value her time as not worth retrieving a pig, this individual
utility value would not be the relevant measure; instead an external
(arguably objective) standard might determine that the hunter’s action of
shooting and leaving the animal are excessively indulgent as a form of

In addition to this opportunity cost, there are also a transaction costs associated with
selling the pig. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1-3, 6-8,
13-19 (1960).
37
IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 70 (explaining deadweight loss as “a loss to one person
not offset by a gain to others.”)
38
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-15 (7th ed.
2007)
39
Cf. Rock Creek Park Sharpshooting Operation Yields 20 Deer available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-01/local/38190208_1_deer-populationssharpshooting-operation-rock-creek-park (describing an operation to reduce the deer
population in Washington, D.C.’s Rock Creek Park, where twenty deer were killed and the
meat was donated to the hungry).
40
This standpoint is traditionally that of utilitarian and economic theories of property.
See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 17.
41
See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 77.
42
Id. at 86.
43
Put another way, this concept calculates opportunity costs from a third-party
perspective.
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luxury or leisure, making the action wasteful. 44 Such a conception of waste
“is not constrained by self-interest” as other forms of waste might be. 45
Alternatively, one may move entirely away from a Lockean,
utilitarian, economic, or frivolous-consumption calculation of waste. If so,
then perhaps killing a pig and leaving it to rot might serve an expressive
function, say if done in the presence of a new business partner, if done as a
statement about the destructive power of guns, or if intended as a
commentary about animal welfare policy. In this case, one might prioritize
the “expressive characteristics of property destruction” over the material
property itself and thereby find no waste. 46 Lior Strahilevitz offers one
example of such expressive behavior in “the Taliban's destruction of the
Buddhas of Bamiyan despite outcry from foreign governments and offers
from museums to purchase some of the works.” 47 From the Taliban’s point
of view, selling the Buddhas may have been a wasted opportunity to make a
major statement. 48
Finally, even without the expressive message, a “Blackstonian,
absolutist notion of ownership” 49 would find no waste in a property owner’s
non-use or even destruction of property at his choosing. 50 Thus, unlike the
Lockean disapproval of killing a wild animal and leaving it to rot in the
forest, under a Blackstonian view, such would not be wasteful, even if done
at a whim, assuming that the killer owned the animal and the right to kill it.
44

This is the same idea that one might “waste time” by watching reality television
instead of reading great works of literature, regardless of the fact that one may derive much
greater utility from the television than the book.
45
See, e.g., id. at 77. See also Davidson, supra note 17 at 767-68 (“One important, if
frequently unstated, assumption underlying much of the diverse literature in this utilitarian
and economic tradition is that the demand being satisfied through the legal institution of
property is essentially self contained. This follows from the proposition in neoclassical
economics that the decision to consume is endogenous, and that production follows the
consumption function. The corresponding assumption in the literature is that people
generally disregard others in consuming, focusing exclusively on their own internally
generated needs.”).
46
See Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 823-24.
47
Id. at 826-27. Strahilevitz goes on to describe the act further: “This destruction had
an obvious religious motivation and meaning. These were not irrational acts of destruction;
they were rational acts that conveyed unmistakable and attention-getting messages. The
fact that the cash-strapped Taliban spurned purchase offers from foreigners shows how
much it valued the expressive opportunity.” Id.
48
See id.
49
Id. at 816.
50
See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, at
Book III, Chapter 14 (“If a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple . . . he may commit
whatever waste his own indiscretion may prompt him to, without being impeachable or
accountable for it to anyone.”). See also McCaffery, supra note 1 at 76 (discussing this
Blackstonian conception of waste).
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While these various examples illustrate some of the more common
conceptions of waste, the chronicle is by no means exhaustive; in fact, it
may represent a rather narrow band in possible ways to think about waste. 51
Nonetheless, the examples help demonstrate that the concept of waste
resists independent, objective, normative content.
Rather, it is an
essentially contested concept that can vary from one individual to the next.
II.

LEGALLY COGNIZABLE WASTE

While possible theoretical conceptions of waste vary vastly, not all
of these moral or philosophical views find legal expression via anti-waste
laws. 52 The law does not respond to or even recognize every idea of waste.
Rather, in seeking to identify and avoid waste, the law embraces a relatively
narrow set of waste concepts as legally cognizable. 53 This Part builds a
framework for understanding exactly how the law identifies waste that is
sufficient to trigger a legal response.
The law recognizes waste based the convergence of two factors: 1)
perceived resource context and 2) specific societal values. To identify
waste, the law first assesses the perceived resource context, determining if
external, physical information suggests that a particular resource is overused or under-used. Next, the law adopts one or more of the following
values: 1) economic efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future
generations, 4) stability and consistency, and 5) ecological concerns.
Reflecting more internal, abstract concepts, 54 these societal values serve as
guides for evaluating the merits of resource uses. As explained further
below, some of these values (such as human flourishing, concern for future
generations, and ecological concerns) complement each other sufficiently
that they may work in combination. Other values take such fundamentally
competing views on the merits of resource uses that they rarely harmonize
and function more singularly (e.g. economic-efficiency values versus
51

For example, each of these illustrations is limited to an anthropocentric approach.
Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1409, 1409 (2012) (“To be sure, explicitly, or more frequently implicitly, private law
theories do recognize the gap between values that should guide us as moral agents and
values that should be entrenched in law.”).
53
Id. (“Given that law backs up its normative prescriptions with coercive power, at
least in a liberal legal system its demands are typically more modest than those of
morality.”).
54
Of course, there is some interdependence and circularity inherent here—perception
of resource context is necessarily influenced by one’s values and one’s values are bound to
change based on perception of the surrounding physical world. Nonetheless, despite the
fact that the two factors can inform each other, they maintain an independence and
descriptive usefulness based on their overall external versus internal and physical versus
abstract properties.
52
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stability and consistency values). Finally, after establishing the perceived
resource context and relevant societal value (or combination of values), the
law defines waste by applying the chosen value(s) to the perceived resource
context.
This framework of applying specific societal values to perceived
resource contexts offers an overarching understanding of how the law
identifies waste. Certainly different combinations of specific values and
perceived resource contexts can lead to vastly divergent substantive
concepts of waste, 55 but the law’s procedure for identifying waste remains
constant across values, contexts, resources, and circumstances.
Moreover, the primacy of perceived resource context and specific
societal values gives legal anti-waste measures a distinction from other
aspects of property law. This is not to say that anti-waste measures are
completely discrete from other regulations on property use, such as zoning,
to take one example. Rather, anti-waste measures differ more in degree than
in kind. However, it is the elevated attention to perceived resource context
and specific societal values that unifies anti-waste doctrines, and the fact
that otherwise disparate doctrines share these common, distinctive concerns
makes their comparisons both theoretically interesting and practically
useful. 56
For example, most property principles take little enduring account of
scarcity and thus little enduring account of perceived resource context. The
theory goes that property rights arise as a response to scarcity, 57 but once
property rights are established, property’s concern with scarcity largely
ends. Certainly scarcity might affect the market price of property, 58 but the
law is, for the most part, hands-off in that regard. With legally cognizable
55

Though the paper will take up many examples of the variety of waste doctrine, a
leading natural resources casebook, JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
AND POLICY 747 (2d ed. 2009), highlights a particularly cogent example. “In the East, to
‘waste’ water is to consume it needlessly or excessively. In the West, to waste water is not
to consume it – to let it flow unimpeded or undiverted down rivers.” Id. (emphasis
original).
56
See discussion infra Part IV.
57
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 32 (1988)
(“Scarcity...is a presupposition of all sensible talk about property....[S]o long as it obtains,
individuals (either on their own or in groups) are going to disagree about who is to make
which use of what.”); Davidson, supra note 17 at (“If a perspective on property might be
said to have achieved dominance in contemporary theory, it is the basic utilitarian and
economic perspective that sees the institution of property primarily as a response to
problems posed by scarcity.”); RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 741 (“After all, the
catalyst for all natural resources law is scarcity.”); POSNER, supra note 38 at 38 (2007) (“if
a resource is valuable but not scarce (a paradox?) the creation of property rights does not
serve an economizing function,”).
58
See generally IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 83-88.
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waste, however, perceptions of relative resource scarcity are central. In fact,
the law’s distaste for waste stems largely from the idea of scarcity. 59
Similarly, waste concepts break from the ordinary property law
mold by elevating other specific societal values above that of autonomy. As
discussed above, property law normally prioritizes autonomy and defers to
the agenda-setting authority of the property owner, 60 but anti-waste
measures that direct resource uses limit this individual autonomy. This is a
key feature of anti-waste provisions: that they remove some of the owner’s
private agenda-setting authority and invest that authority in some other
party, sacrificing a degree of agenda-setting authority in service of the
specific societal values identified above.
This Part examines in more detail how the dual consideration of
perceived resource context and specific societal values gives anti-waste
provisions their character, both in distilling legally cognizable waste from
the essentially contested philosophical concept of waste and in
distinguishing legal anti-waste provisions from other property law
doctrines.
A. Perceived Resource Context
Perception of scarcity is central to legal conceptions of waste. With
no resource scarcity, current or future, there can be no waste, at least not in
the eyes of the law. 61 An infinite resource permits no such concept. Thus,
evaluation of the relative abundance or scarcity of a resource is a
fundamental consideration for legally cognizable waste. Abundance or
scarcity is also a physical, quantitatively measurable, external fact, so
theoretically this is objectively determinable. However, it is the perception
of relative abundance or scarcity, rather than the absolute underlying fact,
that most impacts conceptions of waste.
59

Cf. POSNER, supra note 38 at 27 (“One should not be surprised that in a world of
scarce resources waste should be regarded as immoral”).
60
There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g. Joseph William Singer,
No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U.L. REV.
1283 (discussing limitations on autonomy in the case of public accommodations).
61
This is the case, at least, with physical property. In the intellectual property context,
one might conceive of waste even with relatively non-rival, and thus non-scarce,
intellectual property goods, for example if there is production of the goods that leads to no
benefit. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
299 (1988).
While perceived resource context (i.e. scarcity) is not as applicable in considering
waste of intellectual property, the specific societal values discussed later in this Article help
inform legal ideas of waste for both physical and intellectual property. The balance of this
Article will focus on treatment of waste for physical property and reserve a fuller treatment
of intellectual property for another article.
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Legally cognizable waste concepts are built not just on scarcity;
rather they also include the relationship of resource use to relative scarcity.
For example, if a resource is perceived to be abundant, over-use is less
likely to be a concern, and if a resource is not in demand for use, its
abundance is of less concern. Thus, it is a use-to-scarcity ratio that truly
informs legal waste, and this Article will refer to this ratio as “perceived
resource context.” Three perceived resource contexts impact waste
determinations: satisfactory use, under-use, and over-use.
Satisfactory use does not lead to perceptions of legally cognizable
waste. Anti-waste measures respond to displeasure at perceived resource
misuse, and as far as legal anti-waste measures are concerned, without
sufficient displeasure no waste is occurring. So, if there is satisfactory use,
then there is no need to introduce a new anti-waste measure, and if a
preexisting anti-waste measure is operating to maintain satisfactory use,
there is no need to alter the existing measure. However, when there is
unsatisfactory resource use, whether over-use or under-use, 62 then there can
be legally cognizable waste, and if it is great enough the law will impose or
change anti-waste measures.
Under-use of resources is one example of an unsatisfactory
perceived resource context that can amount to waste. 63 Under-use can be
attributed to under-production of a resource itself, for example insufficient
legal access to extract the natural gas necessary to generate desired energy
levels. 64 Alternately, under-use might also describe the physical escape of a
resource, for example accessing the desired amount of natural gas but
failing to capture or harness a large percentage of it. 65 Under-use can also
describe too little production of positive externalities or co-benefits
associated with a resource use, for example not realizing the desired level of
62

Cf. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1197 (1999) (“[P]eople can waste resources equally through overuse and underuse.”);
WILLIAM ASCHER, WHY GOVERNMENTS WASTE NATURAL RESOURCES: POLICY FAILURES
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 36 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1999) (“[E]ven
conservationists should condemn both over- and underexploitation. We can define
underexploitation as resource development and extraction that falls short of fulfilling
society’s potential for gains, taking into account all considerations of benefits and costs. If
a low level of resource extraction is indeed in society’s interests, perhaps because it permits
the intact resource stock to provide environmental services, or because extraction requires
great economic or environmental costs, then low extraction is optimal; underextraction
would be even lower.”).
63
Cf. McCaffery, supra note 1 at 88 (identifying a conception of waste as “nonuse—
the failure beneficially to use one’s time, talents, or resources.”).
64
Such under-use might result from property entitlements limiting access to natural
gas reservoirs, possibly because of anti-commons or holdout problems. See discussion
infra Part III.B1.
65
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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energy independence due to too little domestic natural gas production
relative to imported fuel.
The converse unsatisfactory perceived resource context is over-use,
which can take two forms. First it can be too much use of an actual
resource, for example burning too much natural gas and causing a perceived
threat to supplies. Alternatively, perceived over-use can describe use of one
resource that causes negative externalities to occur. 66 Such overuse might
include the perception of burning too much natural gas not because of a
threat to supplies but because of its release of harmful greenhouse gasses.
In this sense, the use of one resource might be considered wasteful because
of its impacts on another resource.
In sum, the perception of resource over- or under-use relative to
resource supplies is a key factor in identifying legally cognizable waste.
B. Specific Societal Values
Values complement perceived resource context in informing legally
cognizable waste. In this context, values function like priorities; they offer
guiding principles for preferences in resource use (or non-use). To make
explicit a basic (or at least a linguistically tautologous) connection between
“values” and “value,” it is values that lead people to assign value to
resources. Thus, if waste can be broadly defined as the misuse of a thing of
value, 67 then a thing with no value cannot be wasted, regardless of its
scarcity. Without values as a condition precedent, it is difficult to imagine a
concept of waste.
In the abstract, the catalogue of potential values that might impact a
determination of waste is as long and varied as possible conceptions of
waste. However, a survey of legal anti-waste provisions 68 and scholarship69
reveals that the law embraces only a relative few specific societal values to
identify legally cognizable waste. Specifically, the legally relevant values
are 1) economic efficiency, 2) human flourishing, 3) concern for future
generations, 4) stability and consistency, and 5) ecology. The following
sub-sections discuss how these values inform legal conceptions of waste.
1. Economic-Efficiency Utilitarian Concerns

66

See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 796-97.
Cf. id. at 796 (“Courts have identified two closely related bases for restricting the
right to destroy. While excising theological strains from Locke's antiwaste argument, they
have embraced his notion that society must not tolerate the waste of valuable resources.”)
68
See discussion infra at Part III.
69
See the remainder of this subsection
67
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Welfarist utilitarianism is one of the most important underlying
values to anti-waste laws, as well as to property law in general. 70 This
value, with its concern for economic efficiency, underscores the prevalent
law-and-economics approach to property. 71 Its objective is to maximize the
total wealth of society through efficient allocation of resources, with
efficiency here defined as the point where the societal welfare gains of a
change in resource allocation are greater than the societal welfare losses. 72
Essential to this concept of welfare maximization is how one
calculates welfare, and here welfare simply reflects value as measured by
the willingness to pay for something. 73 Thus, under this approach “value is
simply and strictly a matter of subjective preferences.” 74 The more someone
is willing to pay, the more that person values the item and the more his
owning it contributes to social welfare. In this context, when resources are
prevented from their highest valued use, then they are not efficiently
deployed and waste results.
From this economic point of view, a free market provides the most
potent measure against such waste. As Adam Smith’s famous “invisible
hand” metaphor explains, self-interest will result in gains from trade and put
resources in the hands of those that value them most. 75 The oft-cited Coase
Theorem 76 reflects the same principle, asserting that in functioning markets
with low transaction costs, resources will be allocated efficiently regardless
of initial allocation of property entitlements. 77 The basic economic premise,
as paraphrased by Richard Posner, is that “resources tend to gravitate
toward their most valuable uses if voluntary exchange—a market—is
permitted.” 78
This idea of a voluntary market for valuable uses is strongly tied to
autonomy concepts. After all, measuring the efficient use of a resource
70

See, e.g., Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property
Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2157 (2012) (“The dominant form of legal discourse in
contemporary America is welfarist. … most property scholars presume that maximizing
social welfare is the primary goal of a property system”).
71
See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 745 (2009) (“law-and-economics theory [is] the dominant mode
of theorizing about property in contemporary legal scholarship.”).
72
See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 72; POSNER, supra note 38 at 13. This is also
called the “Kaldor-Hicks” definition of efficiency. See POSNER, supra note 38 at 13.
73
POSNER, supra note 38 at 10.
74
See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 87.
75
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES par. IV.2.9
76
See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 31 (noting that the article laying out the
Coase Theorem “has become the most frequently cited work in all of legal scholarship”).
77
See generally Coase, supra note 36.
78
POSNER, supra note 38 at 9.
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based on subjective preferences 79 evidenced by willingness to pay
necessarily anticipates a wide freedom in choices about resource use. From
an economic point of view, “[t]he value of free choice is a central tenet” 80
and “[a]ny time a consumer is pushed away from his optimal allocation of
income, harm is imposed.” 81 As a result, legal anti-waste measures that
interfere with autonomy by steering resource uses one way or another may
initially seem at odds with economic-efficiency values. 82 Some might even
say they create waste rather than prevent it. 83
However, even anti-waste laws that interfere with a degree of
autonomy can comport with economic efficiency values when the antiwaste measures seek to correct market malfunctions that either prevent
gainful trades or create costs without offsetting benefits. Thus, from the
standpoint of economic efficiency, the primary reason for legal anti-waste
provisions is to prevent barriers to a voluntary market and reduce or
eliminate costs that have no offsetting gains (i.e. deadweight losses). 84 An
economic concept of waste might simply refer to anything that costs more
than necessary (i.e. where costs exceed benefits, assuming that all costs are
internalized). Thus, the goal of economically oriented anti-waste measures
is essentially to internalize all costs and eliminate those that do not yield
benefits. Economically motivated anti-waste measures typically pursue this
goal by reducing transaction costs to allow for gainful trades, internalizing
external costs to allow for correct pricing, and eliminating commons
problems that create deadweight losses.
First, for efficient markets to function, transaction costs, such as the
costs of gathering information or negotiating and formalizing deals, must
not be so high as to prevent gainful trades. 85 For example, a lack of
information to market participants may prevent uninformed parties from
79

See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 87.
IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 1 (discussing the indispensability of free choice in
understanding the concept of a demand curve).
81
Id. at 27.
82
Cf. id. (“regulatory solutions require armies of bureaucrats to write and enforce the
regulations dictating what they think the highest-value uses must be (which are unlikely to
be coincident with consumers’ definitions except perhaps for some ‘median’ citizen). In
this system, it almost certainly is true that many high-value users will be squeezed out of
the market in favor of low-value users, creating a large loss in total surplus”)
83
See id.
84
Id. at 70 (defining deadweight loss as “a loss to one person not offset by a gain to
others. When one person loses utility from some market interference, such as a tax, and no
one gains any utility, then deadweight loss is said to arise.”). Cf. ASCHER, supra note 61 at
1 (“Many rich countries, including the United States, have wasted natural resources and
continue to do so: pastures erode for overgrazing, soils become contaminated, and forests
are leveled, often without offsetting benefits for society.”) (emphasis added).
85
Cf. Coase, supra note 36.
80
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entering trades that would otherwise yield efficient resource uses. 86 Thus,
government intervention may be necessary to foster markets, and thereby
prevent waste, by disseminating information and lowering transaction costs.
Additionally, when meaningfully lowering transaction costs is impossible,
as in the case with assembly problems or bilateral monopolies, 87 economicefficiency may call for adjusting property entitlements to approximate the
result of low transaction costs, leading to more valuable resource uses and
ideally the formation of more functional markets. 88
Second, economically oriented anti-waste measures might seek to
correct market-pricing failures caused by lack of information or
externalized costs. To ensure that the market functions correctly and
resources flow to their highest value uses, it is essential that the cost of
resource use is priced correctly. 89 When there are undervalued or unpriced
costs, the benefits of a resource use may not truly exceed the costs and the
market will not reach the efficient outcome, 90 leading to an instance of
economic waste. 91 A common reason for undervalued or unpriced costs is a
lack of market information, which leads to improper pricing. 92 Thus,
internalizing externalities, whether through disseminating information 93 or
through market correction, is a key aspect of economic anti-waste
measures. 94
86

See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 248. Similarly, assembly problems in
attempting to organize or coordinate property rights among multiple owners can also create
high transaction costs. See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 39.
87
See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 39.
88
Cf. Coase, supra note 36.
89
See ASCHER, supra note 61 at 36 (noting that costs include “not only the direct and
obvious costs of exploiting the resource but also the lost opportunities that developing and
extracting it would foreclose. . . [such as] the economic benefits that alternative uses of
capital, effort, and land itself could have produced [or] the environmental benefits of
leaving the resources intact rather than extracting them.”).
90
Cf. id. at 16 (“[G]overnments chronically ignore the first principle of resource
economics for public lands, namely, that they should charge the users the full value of the
resources they extract, lest the users overexploit ‘cheap’ resources.”)
91
When resource use is underpriced, for example by failing to account for the cost of
negative externalities, “then the resource exploiters can still profit from selling units that
are not societally worthwhile, given the damage they cause.” Id. at 41
92
See id. at 8 (“lack of information . . .will cause resource exploiters to choose the
wrong resources, the wrong timing, or the wrong resource exploitation techniques,
depending on the nature of their ignorance. The consequences may be either under- or
overexploitation, depending on the biases caused by faulty information.”).
93
Disseminating information might also be considered lowering transaction costs of
gaining information. Cf. Coase, supra note 36.
94
A further extension of this economic concept would also evaluate anti-waste
measures to see if the cost of enforcing the measure creates a better result than even an
imperfect market with some externalities. See, e.g., IPPOLITO, supra note 34 at 239 (2005)
(“The real world question is whether a government-imposed solution is likely to generate

24-Mar-14]

Anti-Waste

19

Third, economic anti-waste measures seek to avoid common-pool
resource problems that result in deadweight losses such as rent erosion,
where ill-defined property rights lead to races to capture resources and the
effort spent on these races approaches the value of the resource. 95
Economics considers resources expended on such races as pure waste. 96
Economic anti-waste measures also seek to avoid tragedy-of-the-commons
problems, where individuals with access to a common pool resource each
act in their own self-interest but degrade the resource as a whole. 97
Once anti-waste measures respond to these three issues by enabling
markets and internalizing costs, then, from an economic efficiency
standpoint, the work is largely done and the functioning markets avoid
waste in their natural course.
Economically oriented property and resource law scholarship
identifies and addresses waste in similar market-facilitating and marketcorrecting terms. For example, Richard Posner has explained the doctrine of
landlord-tenant waste as responding to inefficiencies caused by transaction
costs and bilateral monopolies inherent in ownership of divided estates. 98
Similarly, in the natural resource context, Professor William Baxter has
articulated an economic-efficiency “no-waste criterion” as a meta-principle
for environmental policy questions. 99 Baxter’s framework seeks to
maximize “human satisfaction” value from limited resources by engaging in
a cost benefit analysis of resource preservation versus resource use. 100
Moreover, Baxter’s concept of waste expressly counts human willingness to
pay as the sole criterion by which to evaluate resource use decisions, flatly
rejecting any other measure of environmental health or value. 101 Relatedly,
more surplus than an imperfect free market that includes some externalities”)
95
See, e.g., id. at 136.
96
See id. at 227 (“Whenever property rights re ill defined, resources are devoted to
obtaining them. These expenditures are pure waste. Resources used to seize property
rights to an existing asset have an opportunity cost. They could be used to create goods
and services.”)
97
See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2-4 (1990).
98
See Posner, supra note 8 at 1095-96.
99
See WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION
3-4 (1974)
100
See id.
101
See id.at 3-9 (“my criteria are oriented to people, not penguins…. I have no interest
in preserving penguins for their own sake. . . . I reject the proposition that we ought to
respect ‘the balance of nature’ or to ‘preserve the environment’ unless the reason for doing
so, express or implied, is the benefit of man.”). See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People
or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1127, 1131 (1999) (summarizing Baxter’s no-waste criterion in terms of the endangered
species act as “ensuring the optimum use of society’s resources requires not only
identifying the value of endangered species, but weighing that value against the value of
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political scientist William Ascher has relied on the same economic
conception of waste in his book Why Governments Waste Resources,
asserting that “a given resource should be developed only if its net benefits
are greater than the benefits arising from alternative uses, and we should
extract each resource unit when its net benefit is greatest.” 102
2. Human Flourishing Concerns
While economic-efficiency utilitarianism contributes much to
property theory and informs legally cognizable waste, it is not the only
value that the law embraces in identifying and addressing waste. 103 Concern
with human flourishing also animates legal conceptions of waste.
These human flourishing concerns are actually not too dissimilar to
economic-efficiency utilitarianism in their objectives, 104 for both economicefficiency utilitarianism and human flourishing values have in common the
idea of maximizing some measure of social welfare. The key difference
between the two, however, is how one measures social welfare, and this
distinction in welfare metrics can lead to vastly different conceptions of
waste. Human flourishing measures waste according to fundamental human
needs rather than market efficiency.
the other uses to which we could put the resources necessary to save endangered species.”).
102
ASCHER, supra note 61 at 36.
103
Cf. Vlad Tarko, Elinor Ostrom’s Life and Work, in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONS:
BEYOND MARKET FAILURE AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION 50 (IEA 2012) (“Economic
efficiency is just one possible social goal among many, and most people would disagree
that it is a goal that trumps all others. Other social goals such as fairness, stability, social
peace, voice and inclusivity, liberty, long-term resilience and adaptability, are often
considered as important if not more important than economic efficiency.”); ASCHER, supra
note 61 at 253 (“the efficiency concerns [discussed in his book] have obviously focused on
natural-resources exploitation. Yet there is another notion of efficiency that emerges . . . .
Given that sound resource exploitation is often sacrificed in order to pursue other
objectives, we may also ask how well those other objectives are achieved through
maneuvers in resource sectors. Does this success make up for the waste of natural
resources?”); POSNER, supra note 38 at 11, 27 (“efficiency, when used . . . to denote that
allocation of resources in which value is maximized, has limitations as an ethical criterion
of social decisionmaking” and “there is more to justice than economics . . . ”).
104
Cf. Jedediah Purdy, A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 949, 955 (2009) (“For uber-utilitarian Jeremy Bentham and his
followers, the moral gravamen of the program was (in significant part) that it counted the
well-being of all alike; those reformers scorned obscurantist modes of reasoning that they
saw as preserving the inequitable privileges of elites. Utilitarianism, then, was in good part
a view about equality, and as a mode of justification, it relied on the idea that all who
participated in social life were obliged to respect that idea of equality--that is, to embrace a
set of institutions and rules designed on the principle that the welfare (or, happiness) of
each counted alike.”).
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As discussed above, economic-efficiency utilitarianism measures
welfare as the aggregate of subjective preferences. This is an endogenous
measure reflected by willingness to pay, and economic-efficiency does not
concern itself with the underlying motivation, context, or urgency of these
preferences. Under this measure, waste is a failure to put a resource to its
highest value use, and individual computations of value are left
unexamined.
Human flourishing values, however, take a different measure of
welfare, and thus a different measure of waste. Rather than serving
endogenous, subjective valuation, human flourishing concerns attempt to
serve an exogenous, objective valuation. Such an approach might disregard
individual subjective preferences in favor of some conception of what is in
the best interest of society, i.e. what is fundamentally necessary for a life
well-lived. Put another way, the economically-efficient use of a resource
may not be its best use from a human flourishing point of view, so the value
neutrality of economic-efficiency gives way to a prioritization of resource
uses. Under this approach, a resource use that does not sufficiently serve
fundamental human needs may be considered wasteful, even if it would
fetch the highest price. 105
Gregory Alexander has articulated how this human flourishing value
might fit in the broader context of property law, suggesting that “[s]ocial
structures, including distributions of property rights and the definition of the
rights that go along with the ownership of property, should be judged, at
least in part, by the degree to which they foster the participation by human
beings in these objectively valuable patterns of existence and
interaction.” 106 Alexander has stressed property law’s role in “cultivating
the conditions necessary for members of our communities to live well-lived
lives and to promote just social relations, where justice means something
more than simply aggregate wealth-maximization.” 107
Eduardo Peñalver’s scholarship develops similar themes. For
example, in his virtue-based theory of land use, Peñalver calls for a
“substantive conception of the human good or flourishing,” 108 which
requires “recognition of the importance of values in addition to those of
self-interested wealth maximization.” 109 Peñalver further suggests that
“owners' rights are qualified by an obligation to share from their surplus
105

See Davidson, supra note 17 at 798 (“the assumption of value neutrality has long
been challenged and critiques about materialism and ecological harm fit comfortably
within a normative tradition that does not concede that all preference satisfaction is
equal.”).
106
Alexander, supra note 70 at 764.
107
Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
108
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 864-867 (2009).
109
Id.
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property with those who need them in order to satisfy more fundamental
needs.” 110
Though not expressly addressing the idea of waste, Alexander’s and
Peñalver’s approaches outline the human flourishing value that identifies
legally cognizable waste not in terms of willingness to pay but rather in
terms of satisfaction of objectively recognized fundamental needs for a life
well-lived. Such needs certainly include the basics for human survival, but
they can extend further depending on the recognized conception of what
aspects are necessary for a fulfilling life.
Such a concept of waste based on human flourishing and
fundamental needs strikes a common chord with Edward McCaffery’s
work, which identifies a concept of waste as non-urgent luxury
expenditures. Drawing upon the philosophies of Thomas Scanlon and John
Rawls, 111 McCaffery measures waste not by the economic-efficiency
guided subjective valuation but instead by objective measures of
interpersonal value, described by Scanlon and, in turn, McCaffery, as
“urgency.” 112 While McCaffery leaves some play in the definition of
urgency, he ties it to the general idea of fundamentally necessary and
important expenditures. Thus he offers “it is ‘waste,’ say, to spend money
on a lesser urgent need while allowing a more pressing matter to wait, or to
buy one more luxury car or fur coat when one has garages and closets full
enough as is.” 113 McCaffery also illustrates nonurgent waste in terms of
natural resources, positing that “nonurgent waste of capital is a harmful
public use: Squandering money on baubles is like failing to replenish the
soil or polluting waterways.” 114
A concept of waste based on these human flourishing ideals
necessitates anti-waste measures that go beyond merely facilitating and
correcting markets. Unlike the economic-efficiency value, which relies on
functioning markets to combat waste, in the case of fundamental needs and
non-urgent waste, one “cannot count on the invisible hand of subjective
self-interested action to serve the collective good” because the “subjective
and reasonable objective interests diverge when it comes to nonurgent
110

Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
See McCaffery, supra note 1 at 87.
112
See, e.g., id.
113
See, e.g., id. at 88.
114
Id. at 92. See also Davidson, supra note 17 at 757 (“In particular, status signaling
can skew property's incentive and allocative benefits, leading people to over-invest in
status-enhancing property and undermining welfare gains associated with trades around
property” and “this may over-incentivize the production of, or investment in, status-related
resources. These kinds of incentives perennially risk misallocation, both between the
choice to invest resources in property and the choice not to, and between status-related
versus non-status-related resources within the realm of property.”)
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waste.” 115 Thus, anti-waste measures designed to serve human flourishing
concerns must define objective interests and steer resource use in those
directions, thereby curtailing autonomy in service of some identified greater
good.
3. Concern for Future Generations
Closely related to the concern for human flourishing is the concern
for future generations, which takes account of the flourishing of those to
come. 116 As Edith Brown Weiss has noted, “the notion that each generation
holds the earth as a trustee or steward for its descendants strikes a deep
chord with all cultures, religions, and nationalities. Nearly all human
traditions recognize that we, the living, are sojourners on earth and
temporary stewards of our resources.” 117 Thus, when animated by concern
for future generations, “a social welfare measure might accord similar
weight to the well-being of individuals ten generations into the future as it
does to the well-being of the present generations.” 118 From this perspective,
waste means a foreclosing of options for future generations to meet their
needs.
While this concern for future generations is widely held, it raises the
question of which anti-waste measures best protect the interests of
generations to come. Some scholars have suggested that economicefficiency principles, such as those discussed above, sufficiently protect
future generations from waste and thus no further anti-waste measures are
necessary. 119 For example, Harold Demsetz has offered the influential
theory that property owners with sufficiently durable rights will optimally
maximize the value of property over time rather than overexploit it in the
short term. 120 Richard Posner has illustrated this concept through the
example of how economic incentives will prevent a private owner from
prematurely depleting natural resources such as timber: 121
115

See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 88.
See ASCHER, supra note 61 at 32 (“a resource practice should not lead to lower
societal well-being for future generations”).
117
Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable
Development, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 19, 20 (1992). See also EDITH BROWN WEISS,
IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (1989).
118
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (2004).
119
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1465, 1466 (1989).
120
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AMERICAN ECONOMIC
REVIEW, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, 57 (1967): 347-59. See also Peñalver, supra note 107
at 848.
121
See POSNER, supra note 38 at 87.
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In deciding whether to cut down a tree, the private owner of the land
on which the tree is growing will consider not only the revenue from the sale
of the timber and the cost of cutting down and sawing the tree but also the
opportunity cost of not waiting until the tree has grown to its full height. 122

Applying these concepts to the anti-waste context leads to the
conclusion that functioning markets should sufficiently protect future
generations from waste. The theory suggests that the market should account
for both present and future costs and benefits and thus should attend to the
needs of future generations through the same invisible hand that prevents
waste in the present.
However, this theory has drawn criticism on the basis that the
market cannot sufficiently serve future generations due to present-value
discounting, split incentives between divided interests, and the durability of
present resource uses. 123 As a result, concern for future generations may
define waste more broadly than the economic-efficiency utilitarian
conception, and efforts to protect future generations from waste may go
beyond mere market correction.
The first reason that markets may not sufficiently shield future
generations from waste comes from the idea that even in functioning
markets, present-value discounting of future costs and benefits may lead
rational actors to waste resources from the perspective of future generations.
Rational economic actors make decisions based on “present value of net
benefits” which requires “adjust[ing] the valuation of benefits and costs
occurring at different times.” 124 This leads to discounting of future benefits
because “generally, a benefit coming earlier is valued more than one
coming later, because of both impatience and the opportunity to invest
current savings for greater value in the future.” 125 Additionally, to the extent
that there is a lack of information on future costs and benefits, resource
users are likely to err on the side of maximizing current benefits. 126 By
122

Id.
See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 107.
124
ASCHER, supra note 61 at 33.
125
Id.
126
See id. at 44 (“lack of information . . .will cause resource exploiters to choose the
wrong resources, the wrong timing, or the wrong resource exploitation techniques,
depending on the nature of their ignorance. The consequences may be either under- or
overexploitation, depending on the biases caused by faulty information. However, insofar
as resource exploiters know that ignorance puts them at risk of making blunders in long
term resource development and extraction plans, they tend to extract resources quickly
wherever immediate profits appear. Therefore, there may be a greater tendency toward
immediate overextraction and inadequate resource development. Ignorance will also
provoke wasteful exploitation due to lack of knowledge of true input costs or output
123
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logical extension, this discounting forces property owners to “completely
disregard the consequences of their decisions beyond a certain point in the
future.” 127 As a result:
[P]rivate owners are likely dramatically to underweigh--relative to
short-term consequences--costs (or gains) arising from their land-use choices
when those effects are projected to occur far into the future. This preference
for near-term gains generates intertemporal externalities, which may be
enormous and catastrophic, but which are impossible for an unassisted land
market to internalize. 128

Second, split incentives and divided interests may require further
market interventions to protect future generations from waste. A divided
interest exists between “[t]he present generation, [which] owns the whole of
the earth and all things on it” 129 and future generations, who will come to
own the whole of the earth. Those alive today may not only discount future
uses to present value, but they might also “care very little about the wellbeing of individuals ten generations in the future.” 130 This creates a split
incentive where economic incentives alone will not protect future
generations (which may be thought of as future interest holders) from
wasteful use by the current generation (i.e. present interest holders). Posner
illustrates this concept, once again through the example of economic
incentives regarding the cutting of trees, only this time he presents a split
incentive scenario arising from the divided interests between a life tenant
(present interest holder) and remainderman (future interest holder):
A life tenant will have an incentive to maximize not the value of the
property—that is, the present value of the entire stream of future earnings
obtainable from it—but only the present value of the earnings stream
obtainable during his expected lifetime. He will therefore want to cut timber
before it has attained its mature growth even though the present value of the
timber would be greater if the cutting of some or all of it were postponed, if
the added value would inure to the remainderman.” 131

Since the present generation is in the same present-interest position as
Posner’s hypothetical life tenants, then the same risk of waste exists in
regard to future generations, who are in the same future-interest position as
the hypothetical remainderman. Thus, the concern for future generations
prices.”).
127
Peñalver, supra note 107 at 854.
128
Id.
129
SHAVELL, supra note 117 at 71.
130
Id.
131
POSNER, supra note 38 at 74.
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counsels that legal measures beyond market correction are necessary to
prevent rational, self-interested present-generation property owners from
imposing waste on generations to come. 132
Finally, the enduring legacy of resource uses may also prejudice
future generations. As Peñalver has discussed, resource decisions often
effect durable changes that foreclose options for future generations. 133
Moreover, present resource decisions have longer-term impacts in terms of
“deplet[ing] the capital stock” available to future generations. 134
As a result of such durability of present resource uses as well as
present-value discounting and split incentives between divided interests, the
concept of waste, when viewed from the perspective of future generations,
encompasses more than economic efficiency as measured by willingness-topay. Rather, the idea of waste in terms of future generations also includes
the idea of foreclosing options. As a result, anti-waste measures concerned
with protecting future generations may go beyond facilitating and correcting
market forces and instead affirmatively steer resource uses to preserve
options for generations to come.
4. Stability and Consistency Concerns
Apart from concerns for economic efficiency, human flourishing, or
future generations, values favoring societal stability and consistency also
inform legal conceptions of waste and animate anti-waste principles. These
stability and consistency concerns include protecting settled expectations,
preserving the status quo, ensuring quiet enjoyment of property, or keeping
the peace. Relatedly, these same values also animate efforts to maintain
cultural continuity, which can manifest in measures to preserve cultural
legacies or identities, such as historic buildings in urban settings or
agricultural land use in farming communities.
From the vantage of stability and consistency concerns, waste takes
the form of disruption, replacement, or alteration of the fundamental
character of some designated resource use. This idea of waste might also be
conceived as the cost (monetarily, emotionally, culturally, or otherwise) of
shifting expectations and adapting to new circumstances. Examples of such
waste might include tearing down a historic building, selling a town park
into private ownership and thereby eliminating public access, or shifting a
132

Cf. id. at 73 (2007) (“law has an important role to play in regulating divided
ownership”).
133
Peñalver, supra note 107 at 853 (“The durability of land-use decisions'
consequences and the finite quantity of land mean that the decisions that current owners
make about how to use their land will reverberate for generations.”).
134
McCaffery, supra note 1 at 94.
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residential neighborhood to commercial use. Such ideas of waste rely on
subjective valuation, but this valuation differs from the economic-efficiency
willingness-to-pay or human-flourishing fundamental-needs metrics
discussed above. Instead, this stability and consistency concern responds a
social value placed on preservation or continuation of certain cultural
resource uses.
Joseph Sax’s scholarship develops some of these stability and
continuity concerns. For example, in his book Playing Darts with a
Rembrandt, Sax highlights the cultural values in fine art, architecture,
important papers, and antiquities, suggesting that “[s]ome objects, …
regardless of who owns them, are important to a larger community.”135
Accordingly, Sax argues, the “larger community has a legitimate stake [in
these objects] because they embody ideas, or scientific and historic
information, of importance.” 136 Thus, Sax suggests that unqualified notions
of ownership are inappropriate for such property, and he proposes
protections, which essentially amount to anti-waste measures, guarding
against destruction or denial of access to this property. 137
These same values underscore decisions to regulate resource uses
for the purpose of protecting communities, cultural traditions, or ways of
life, for instance by restricting the sale of water so that agricultural
communities maintain their character and do not give way to other forms of
development. 138 In fact, Sax has addressed similar issues in the context of
water use. For example, Sax has described water as “a community’s capital
stock” 139 as well as a “heritage resource.” 140 Extending this concept,
stability and continuity values counsel protecting such cultural interests in
heritage resources from waste because communities are attached to water in
the same way that cultures are attached to their antiquities and cultural
properties. 141 Explicitly linking Sax’s concepts to the idea of waste, Buzz
Thompson has noted that “the central importance of water to communities’
development and sustainability has spawned universal rules against waste”
and “[t]he United States Supreme Court also has lent some credence to the
135

SAX, supra note 8 at 1.
Id. at 9.
137
Id.at 9-10.
138
See, e.g., In re Application of Sleeper, Rio Arriba County No. RA 84-53(C) (N.M.
1st Jud. Dist. April 16 1985) (denying a water transfer application from farmers to a ski
resort because “it is simply assumed by the Applicants that greater economic benefits are
more desirable than the preservation of cultural identity. This is clearly not so….”).
139
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61
U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 276, 282 (1990).
140
See Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the
Privatization of Water, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 13, 14 (1994).
141
See id.
136
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heritage concept by suggesting that states can prohibit the exportation of
water in some settings where the Constitution would prohibit similar
hoarding of other natural resources.” 142
Whether deployed toward community interests in natural resources,
art, or architecture, these cultural stability and continuity values also
resonate with Margaret Radin’s scholarship linking property and
personhood. Drawing on Hegel’s philosophy of property rights, 143 Radin
suggests that certain types of property closely contribute to one’s
personhood and self-conception and thus should be treated differently than
otherwise fungible property. 144 To extend this personhood concept from the
individual to the community level, just as certain forms of property may be
bound up in identity and self-conception, so may certain resources be bound
up in the defining attributes of a community, and such resources may merit
anti-waste protections.
Taken together, these approaches contribute to a conception of
waste as the interruption, destabilization, or destruction of culture,
community, or identity.
5. Ecological Concerns
Finally, ecological values introduce a concept of waste concerned
with maintaining ecosystem integrity. While this subsection makes no
attempt at comprehensively surveying the rich field of environmental ethics,
it highlights a few noteworthy examples of ecological values that have
influenced legally cognizable waste conceptions. For instance, Aldo
Leopold’s “land ethic” is considered “probably the most influential
statement of ethics in the American environmental movement.” 145 In it
Leopold lays a foundation for ecologically centered conceptions of waste,
stating “[i]t is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist
without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its
value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere
142

Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph
Sax’s Water Scholarship, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 368-69 (1998) (citing Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)).
143
See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968,
971-78 (1982).
144
See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 54-78 (1996); Radin,
supra note 142 at 968, 971-78. See also Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and
Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1620-21 (2008); Davidson, supra note
17 at (“Just as the basic economic approach to property generally assumes endogenous
demand, it is likewise significant that prevailing conceptions of property and identity take
the relationship between property and personhood as largely inward looking.”).
145
RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 13.
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economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense." 146 To
operationalize this concept, Leopold suggests evaluating resource uses “in
terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is
economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it
tends otherwise.” 147
Sax’s scholarship has incorporated similar ecological concepts. For
example, Sax has called for “property rights designed to accommodate both
transformational needs and the needs of nature's economy.” 148 Moreover,
Sax has advocated for “[resource] use . . . determined ecosystemically,
rather than tract by tract;” “[i]ncreased ecological planning, because
different kinds of lands have different roles;” and “[a]ffirmative obligations
by owners to protect natural services.” 149
Because these ecological perspectives respond to inherent ecosystem
values that evade monetary measures, cost-benefit analyses are inapplicable
and inappropriate as a metric for determining waste. 150 Instead, Leopold’s
metric of preserving the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community serves as a central guiding principle of ecologically oriented
anti-waste measures. 151
III.

ANTI-WASTE MEASURES

Part II set out a framework for identifying legally cognizable waste
through the convergence of perceived resource context and specific societal
values. Part III now extends that framework to explain how the law
addresses legally cognizable waste via anti-waste provisions. In responding
to the perceived resource contexts and specific societal values discussed
above, anti-waste provisions have displayed both commonality and
consistency. Despite arising in fundamentally different circumstances
across various resources, jurisdictions, and time periods, legal anti-waste
measures fall within one of three categories: usage vetoes, market146

ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC—AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE
223 (1949) (emphasis added).
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Id. at 226
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See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1441
(1993).
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See, e.g., id.
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See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562-63 (2002); Amy
Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 533, 536-37 (2007); Peñalver, supra note 107 at 850-51.
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facilitating measures, and sustainability measures. Usage-veto provisions
empower selected parties to halt perceived wasteful changes to resource
uses; market-facilitating measures prevent economic waste by encouraging
and correcting markets; and sustainability measures proscribe wasteful
overconsumption of resources fundamental to human and ecosystem
flourishing. This Part details how anti-waste laws originate and operate
according to these consistent structures.
A. Usage Vetoes
Usage-veto anti-waste measures, which include some of the earliest
anti-waste doctrines instituted in the American legal experience, respond
primarily to stability and continuity values and arise in perceived resource
contexts of overuse or threatened overuse. To prevent such overuse, usageveto measures essentially bestow on certain select individuals a private veto
power over the resource uses of others. 152 Thus, these doctrines withdraw
from the owner some autonomy over resource uses and shift that authority
to particular private individuals. 153 The individuals selected to receive this
veto authority normally favor established resource uses and thus exercise
the veto authority to “arrest a future conflicting use.” 154 As a result, these
usage-veto measures consistently limit resource development in favor of
maintaining the status quo. 155 Through this “semi-preservationist”156
system, usage-veto measures guard against waste, as conceived from the
152

See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 6 at 687 (describing the law of landlord-tenant waste as
a presumptive veto).
153
By limiting owners’ agenda-setting rights, usage-veto measures resemble what
Henry Smith has described as “governance rules,” which “require the specification of
proper activities” or “prescribe proper use” of a resource. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
453 (2002). See also Katz, supra note 11 at 275 (“Governance rules represent the kind of
ad hoc, pragmatic determination of use rights” and “On a governance strategy, unlike on
the exclusion strategy, the owner is not picked out as special vis-à-vis others.”).
However, as the doctrines discussed in this section will demonstrate, unlike many
examples of governance rules, in which agenda-setting authority shifts from the owner to a
governmental entity, in the case of usage-veto rules, agenda setting authority shifts from
the owner to another private individual.
154
See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 32
(1977) (internal quotations omitted).
155
Id. at 32, 36. For example, one eighteenth century doctrine for resolving conflicts
over property uses was “an explicitly antidevelopment theory, limit[ing] property owners to
what courts regarded as the natural uses of their lands.” Id. See also Freyfogle, supra note
22 at 75 (“Before the coming of industrialism, American law largely resolved conflicts by
favoring land uses that were sensitive or that came first in time, at the expense of later,
more intensive land uses.”).
156
See Sprankling, supra note 18.
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standpoint of stability and continuity values, in the form of disrupting,
replacing, or altering resource uses. 157
Early American property doctrines inherited directly from English
property law typify how usage-veto measures promoted the value of
stability in resource uses. 158 These measures arose in England, which had
developed to the extent that its environs would allow and wanted to avoid
perceived overuse of resources such as wood and water, which were in
relatively limited supply. 159 Further, the English laws reflected a concern
for preserving certain “natural” uses of land, such as historic agricultural
practices. 160
Against this backdrop, the doctrine of landlord-tenant waste arose to
regulate how a term- or life-tenant could use the estate she occupied. 161 This
English law of landlord-tenant waste initially governed the American
colonies, and it provided that a landlord could expect that his tenant would
return the property to him unaltered unless the landlord consented to some
form of change. 162 Thus, landlords, who were often concerned with overuse
or changes to existing use of land, held veto rights over their tenants’ use of
resources, and they routinely disallowed tenants from cutting trees or
converting land from forest to farm. 163 As a result, this usage-veto system
157

See discussion supra at Part II.B.4.
See HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 36 (positing that a prevailing conception in early
American history was that resources were “not essentially an instrumental good or a
productive asset but rather a private estate to be enjoyed for its own sake.”).
159
See Sprankling, supra note 18 (“Altering the character of land--for example,
converting forest to farm land--was deemed waste. Similarly, subject to intricate exceptions
for wood used on the property for fuel and repairs, any cutting of “timber” trees--such as
oak, ash, and elm--generally constituted waste. In part, these precepts reflected a wooddependent economy increasingly hobbled by a wood scarcity. Confronted with the choice
between exploiting or conserving the nation's dwindling forests, English law unsurprisingly
favored conservation.”).
See also id. at 524-25 (“Eighteenth-century English property law was a poor tool
for encouraging the exploitation of virgin land. The vast English wilderness had vanished
long before the discovery of America, leaving a semipreservationist property law system
attuned to a postwilderness nation. Most of the English countryside resembled a large
garden, with crop land and permanent grass pasture occupying over half of the land
surface; the forest remnants were uniformly devoted to human use, as woodlot, pasture, or
the like. The property law system focused on preserving the condition of land already in
productive use in a mature agrarian economy, not on expanding an inchoate economy
through the settlement of wild land. Moreover, in an England plagued by a chronic wood
shortage, the system was already oriented toward protection of the nation's dwindling forests. Stability, not innovation, was the heart of English property law.”) (emphasis added).
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See id.
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See Purdy, supra note 6 at 658.
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See id.
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See Sprankling, supra note 18.
Landlord tenant waste can also be seen as serving an economic-efficiency value in
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“perpetuate[d] the land-use status quo . . . by preferring existing uses to new
uses,” 164 and thereby avoided the apparent waste that came from altering the
property.
Another example of usage-veto measures limiting development in
service of stability values comes from the early American experience with
the English water-law doctrine of natural flow. This doctrine prevented
interference with water flowing in its natural course and held “any use of
water that conflicted with the interests of any other proprietor on the stream
was an unlawful invasion of his property.” 165 Thus, while water could be
used for domestic purposes or husbandry, both of which required little
diversion of water and thus did not materially change flow, “all other
interference with the natural flow of water, including both diversion and
obstruction, were illegal without the consent of all who have an interest in
it.” 166 This effectively gave down-stream water users the power to veto
upstream water-uses that involved any substantial diversion of water.
Preventing increased diversion of water effectively prevented changes in
both water- and land-use, again averting perceived wasteful disruption of
settled usage patters.
A century after the colonial period, early laws governing oil and gas
exploration in America also imposed usage-veto measures that effectively
curtailed development in service of preserving the status quo. For example,
landowners had to limit drilling efforts because neighbors could sue to
prevent a well from draining oil and gas resources from beyond the property
line. 167 With oil and gas rights tied to land ownership, 168 parties relied on
the longstanding English ad coelum doctrine for the proposition that a
landowner also owned the oil beneath his land, 169 regardless of the fact that
oil and gas resources are fugacious rather than fixed in place. 170 Fearing that
a well would pull a neighbor’s oil or gas across the property line and give
rise to liability, early extractors had to carefully space their wells to avoid

terms of managing “the temporally inefficient situation of a present owner neglecting the
interests of some future owner.” See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 1 at 84. However, this
will be discussed at greater length in the next section, where economic efficiency concerns
attempt to strike a more optimal balance between present use and future interests.
164
See Sprankling, supra note 18.
165
See HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 35.
166
Id. at 36 (internal quotations omitted).
167
Cf. BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK R. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND
UNITIZATION § 1.02 (3d Ed. 2012).
168
Id.
169
The ad coelum doctrine derived from Lord Coke’s maxim: Cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos; translated: “To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also
to the sky and to the depths.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979).
170
See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 166.
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draining resources from under neighboring tracts. 171 Thus, a neighbor
enjoyed implicit power to veto oil and gas exploration near the property
lines, and hydrocarbon production suffered. Though these impacts on oil
and gas development were likely unintended, they reflect how a usage-veto
system focuses on the value of maintaining existing land uses, here
represented by ad coelum expectations, at the expense of new resource
development, here oil and gas production. 172
Usage-veto measures are not all merely transitional moments in
history or anachronistic carryovers, however. Certain contemporary
American water-law doctrines still employ usage-veto principles to favor
continuity of existing resource use. For example, the “no harm rule,” a
feature of the prior appropriations regimes 173 common to the western United
States, gives downstream water users a veto power similar to that conferred
by the natural flow doctrine. Under the no harm rule, a downstream water
appropriator may, upon the showing of harm, prevent an upstream water
appropriator from selling his water right or changing the nature of his water
use. 174 This is the case regardless of whether the upstream appropriator has
a more senior right to take water from the stream or whether the water
would be transferred to a more valuable monetary or societal use. 175 Rather,
just like the natural flow doctrine, the no harm rule protects stability and
continuity of existing uses by giving downstream resource users a private
veto right. This scheme, like the other usage-veto regimes, cares not about
causing potential economic inefficiencies or social inequalities; rather it is
aimed at preventing one specific kind of waste: the disruption of existing
resource use.
Outside of the natural resource context, additional modern property
doctrines operate on related usage-veto principles. As mentioned earlier,
171

“That in view of the well-known tendency of said wells to drain a large extent of
territory immediately surrounding them, it is the custom and almost universal practice of
oil operators when operating adjoining lands, to locate their wells at least two hundred feet
from the line of lands, in order that so far as reasonably practicable, each operator's well
shall draw its supply from his own land, and not unnecessarily disturb or detract from the
oil mineral wealth of the adjoining lands.” Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897)
(the first case to apply a rule of capture analysis to a simple migration of gas across
property boundaries).
172
Moreover, the perceived resource context centered on preventing waste in the sense
of overusing a neighbor’s resources; the law was not aimed at addressing under-use or
under-development of hydrocarbon resources, both because of stability values and because
hydrocarbons had not emerged as a major energy source and thus were not widely
perceived as under-used.
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See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 781.
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In some circumstances, however, the no harm rule can lead to economically
efficient results. See POSNER, supra note 38 at 77.
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historic preservation laws serve stability and continuity values by
preventing destruction or alternation to certain designated resource uses,
usually in the form of building structures or neighborhood identities.176
These laws employ a usage-veto system by removing some of an owner’s
autonomy to alter designated historic property and empowering a third
party, usually an historic preservation council, the right to veto proposed
changes. 177
Artists’ rights laws function in a similar manner. These laws protect
an artist’s right to the integrity of her work by preventing destruction or
alteration of certain pieces of art without the artist’s permission. 178 Thus,
regardless of who owns the art as property, the artist maintains authority to
veto certain perceived wasteful or destructive uses.
Finally, organ donation practice offers an example of usage-veto
measures at work. 179 Even when individuals opt to donate their organs, a
usage-veto structure gives the family, or even a lone family member,
practical veto power over the deceased’s decision to donate. 180 This antiwaste provision shows no concern for increasing the number of achievable
transplants or preventing needless destruction of organs. 181 Instead, the
practice aims at preventing waste in the form of disrupting stability and
continuity, in this case the stability of the historic cultural respect for the
wishes of the deceased’s family, even at the expense of overriding the
autonomy of the deceased.
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See generally SAX, supra note 8 at 48-59.
See id.
178
See generally id. at 21-35; Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. 106;
Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, G.L. c. 231 s 85S; California Art Preservation Act,
Cal. Civ. Code s 987.
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See Strahilevitz, supra note 8 at 803-805.
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Although the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provides that the
decedent's decision to donate his organs is decisive, hospitals typically will
not harvest them unless his family also consents, even where the decedent has
signed an organ donor card. In many cases where a decedent has indicated a
desire to donate his organs on his driver's license, family objections prevent
the transplantation of organs. Finally, in cases where a decedent has multiple
next of kin (e.g., a parent survived by several children), the objections of any
one relative can prevent a transplant as a practical matter. In short, either a
decedent or his heirs usually can block physicians from transplanting his
organs. The impediments that American law and custom place in the path of
the socially responsible would-be donor are substantial.”
Id. at 805-806.
181
See id. at 804 (describing the “needless destruction of otherwise transplantable
organs”).
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B. Market-Facilitating Measures
A second type of anti-waste laws, market-facilitating measures,
respond to a set of perceived resource contexts and values that contrast
sharply with those underlying usage-veto measures. Market-facilitating
measures are usually rooted in the perceived resource context of under-use,
which they seek to remedy by spurring and correcting markets for resource
development. Moreover, unlike the stability concerns underlying usageveto measures, the primary value motivating market-facilitating measures is
economic efficiency. 182
Though market-facilitating measures are still active today and need
not necessarily follow usage-veto measures, many early market-facilitating
measures arose as nineteenth century American property law responded to
the development needs of the young nation 183 and reacted to the semipreservationist usage-veto measures inherited from English law. 184 These
doctrines reflected a new perceived resource context that viewed the
American continent as one of limitless resources 185 that were drastically
under-used. In fact, the perception of underuse was so great that “[e]arly
Americans viewed the seemingly endless wilderness with repugnance. It
impeded progress, retarded prosperity, and blocked national expansion.” 186
Societal values also shifted, replacing the allegiance to stability and
continuity with the primacy of economic development. 187 As Morton
Horwitz has described:
[A]s the spirit of economic development began to take hold of
American society in the early years of the nineteenth century . . . the idea of
property underwent a fundamental transformation – from a static agrarian
conception entitling an owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a dynamic,
instrumental, and more abstract view of property that emphasized the newly

182

Cf. POSNER, supra note 38 at 55 (“[A]lways to assign the property right to the prior
of two conflicting land uses . . . would be inefficient, for the later use often will be more
valuable yet transaction costs may be prohibitive.”).
183
See Sprankling, supra note 18 at (“[o]ur common law of property is best explained
as an instrumentalist adaptation of English doctrines to American wilderness conditions.”).
184
See id. (“This change in resource context and valuation necessitated a change from
the earlier English law approaches.”)
185
See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994) (describing the perception of “a seemingly infinite supply of
wild animals, minerals, water and other fugitive resources.”).
186
See Sprankling, supra note 18 at 530-31.
187
See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 22 at (“Then along came industrialism and its siren
call to allow landowners to use their lands more forcefully, creating noises and vibrations,
blocking waterways, and otherwise causing disruptions. The right to use land intensively
went up while the opposing right to quiet enjoyment declined”).

36

Anti-Waste

[24-Mar-14

paramount virtues of productive use and development. 188

Thus the prevailing societal value of the time became one of economic
efficiency rooted in “exploitative utilitarianism: land in its natural condition
was considered essentially worthless until converted to human use.” 189
As a result, the conception of waste necessarily changed. Gone was
the idea of waste as the disruption of continuity in resource uses or
alteration of the status quo. Reflecting quite the opposite conception “the
image of a continent tied up in primeval forest [became] a bogeyman; no
one [would] have argued seriously that the clearing of frontier land should
be regarded as waste.” 190 Instead, waste came to mean failure to reach
developmental potential, and anti-waste measures shifted accordingly from
usage-veto to market-facilitating.
For example, “in the nineteenth century . . . American judges
beg[a]n to argue that the English law of [landlord-tenant] waste [was]
inapplicable to a new, unsettled country, because of its restraint on
improvement of land.” 191 Courts thus narrowed the doctrine of landlordtenant waste as applied to wild lands and “jettisoned the waste doctrine's
ban on clearing forest land for cultivation.” 192 Instead, the new American
version of landlord-tenant waste permitted tenants to alter land as consistent
with “good husbandry,” which essentially encouraged immediate economic
development of the land. 193 Thus, the legal concept shifted from considering
it wasteful to develop land against the wishes of a landlord to considering it
wasteful to allow a landlord to stand in the way of development. 194
Moreover, by changing the waste standard from anti-development to pro188

HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 31.
Sprankling, supra note 18 at. See also HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 33, 37 (noting
that judicial opinions began to reflect “the idea that the ownership of property implies
above all the right develop that property for business purposes”); Purdy, supra note 6 at
692. (“[p]rogress and improvement were the courts' aims, and westward movement across
the continent was synonymous with betterment.”).
190
Purdy, supra note 6 at 676.
191
HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
192
Sprankling, supra note 18.
193
See HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 54, 58.
194
Not all landlord-tenant waste doctrines have evolved in such a way. In the case of
waste to structures, a number of courts still hold that any change constitutes waste. See
Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402
(App. Div. 1930), aff'd mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931). Other course have
allowed changes that enhance value. See, e.g., Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 78, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899). See generally Merrill, supra note 5.
To the extent that the American doctrine of waste has allowed for good
husbandry, it goes further toward meeting efficiency goals like those articulated by Richard
Posner in suggesting that an efficient solution would be to allow a tenant to do what a
rational owner would have incentive to do. See
189
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development, these economically oriented anti-waste provisions reduced
transaction costs for tenants seeking to make more valuable uses of
property. 195
During the same time period, the emergence of the adverse
possession doctrine to encourage economic utilization of wild land also
reflected a market-facilitating anti-waste measure. 196 While the doctrine
may have originated to protect title, 197 “beginning in the nineteenth century,
American courts serving the ideology of economic expansion reformulated
adverse possession in the pursuit of national productivity.” 198 To spur
development, adverse possession became a “tool designed to transfer title to
wild lands from the idle true owner to the industrious adverse possessor.” 199
Similar to the landlord-tenant waste doctrines discussed in the previous
paragraph, this approach to adverse possession again reduced transaction
costs that would impede the development of wild land. Further, by reducing
the threshold for adverse possession “to the point where sporadic,
inconspicuous activities sufficed to create title,” 200 courts ensured that “title
to wild lands [could] be maintained only through progressive
exploitation.”201 Thus, adverse possession encouraged economic progress
by embracing a concept of “exploitative utilitarianism” that “equat[ed]
preservation with waste.” 202 In this way, it exemplified a market-facilitating
measure in seeking to combat under-use by spurring development of
financially valuable resource uses that would bring goods to market.
Nineteenth-century laws encouraging development of water mills
offer another example of market-facilitating measures at work. 203 Relying
on dams to harness waterpower, water mills were an important energy
source in early America. 204 However, since the dams created reservoirs that
could flood adjacent properties, liability concerns stood in the way of mill
construction. Thus, to promote development of water mills, states passed
195

See, e.g., Posner, supra note 6.
See Sprankling, supra note 184 (“Indeed, the limitations model is occasionally
defended on the ground that such repose encourages the utilization of land.”). See also
POSNER, supra note 38 at 71-74 (discussing different methods for creating an efficient
management strategy for divided-ownership estates).
197
See Sprankling, Adverse Possession (“Land utilization is a muted, subordinate
theme in a doctrine dominated by concern for title protection.”)
198
Sprankling, supra note 184.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 47 (noting that “mill acts” represent “some of the
earliest illustrations of American willingness to sacrifice the sanctity of private property in
the interest of promoting economic development.”).
204
See id. at 49-50.
196
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“mill acts” that limited flooding liability205 and thereby lowered the
transaction costs involved in creating mills. Justified on the basis of “an
increase in total utility,” 206 these mill acts displayed economic-efficiency
values and drove development to remedy the perceived under-use of water
power.
Even earlier in American history, concern with the same concept of
waste led to a market-facilitating approach in land-dealings with Native
Americans. For example, the Supreme Court’s canonical 1823 decision in
Johnson v. M'Intosh “defended the European conquest of America with the
explanation that to ‘leave (Native Americans) in possession of their country,
was to leave the country a wilderness,’ a consequence seemingly so
abhorrent as to end debate.” 207 Thus, the Court essentially justified
European control of North America on the economic grounds that this result
would better allow resources to flow to their most valuable uses (i.e. it
would reduce transaction costs for development), and this line of reasoning
again reflects the perception of waste as un-seized development
opportunity.
These market-facilitating doctrines are not limited to early American
law, though; modern resource doctrines continue to drive market
development. For the most part, the adverse possession principles adopted
in the nineteenth-century still apply to wild land today, 208 and a similarly
motivated doctrine applies to leases for oil and gas extraction on federal
public lands. 209 To spur the development of marketable resources, the law
will terminate leases unless leaseholders undertake exploration activities
within a certain timeframe. 210 Moreover, until recently the Swampbusters
program actively encouraged filling wetlands to transform them into more
market-valuable agricultural land. 211 Similarly, some state and local
property tax assessments rely on fair market value as determined by the
highest and best use of land rather than its actual use, 212 creating an added
incentive for development.

205

See generally id. at 47-49.
Id. at 49.
207
Sprankling, supra note 18.
208
See id.
209
See 4 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 39:28 (2d ed. 2007) (“Private oil and gas leases are structured to force
the lessee to drill or forfeit the lease, a diligence requirement mostly, but not entirely,
duplicated in the federal context”).
210
See id.
211
See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 270 (3d Ed.)
212
See, e.g., Florida Statute 193.011.
206
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Self Correction of Market-Facilitating Measures
Since an economic-efficiency conception of waste is the primary
value underscoring market-facilitating anti-waste provisions, such
provisions must adapt to address newly discovered market malfunctions,
such as emerging information about unpriced externalities, transaction
costs, or other barriers to efficient resource transactions. Additionally, as
newer resource uses or development methods arise, older market-facilitating
measures may become outmoded if they continue to encourage earlier uses
that have become less efficient and ultimately economically wasteful
themselves. 213 Thus, to remain true to their underlying economic-efficiency
values, market-facilitating anti-waste measures must remain dynamic in
continuing to pursue the highest value resource uses. 214
The continued adjustment of the landlord-tenant waste doctrine
demonstrates how market-facilitating measures can adapt. While the shift
from the usage-veto English doctrine to the market-facilitating American
doctrine first freed tenants to pursue higher value resource uses through
“good husbandry,” 215 American courts have refined the doctrine further in
pursuit of market efficiency. For example, the American landlord-tenant
waste doctrine formerly “held that any permanent destruction of a structure
constituted waste, even if it improved the value of the parcel as a whole.” 216
However, now many states consider economic value the sole criterion to
consider in determining landlord-tenant waste, 217 and accordingly “an act
that increases the value of property cannot constitute [landlord-tenant]
waste.” 218
The evolution of water law regimes also illustrates how marketfacilitating measures can adapt to serve market-efficiency goals. Initially,
when nineteenth-century American courts needed to “resolve the tension
between the need for economic development and the fundamentally
antidevelopment premise of the common law,” 219 they abandoned the
213

See HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 34. Cf. POSNER, supra note 38 at 55 (“[A]lways to
assign the property right to the prior of two conflicting land uses . . . would be inefficient,
for the later use often will be more valuable yet transaction costs may be prohibitive.”).
214
Cf. HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 34 (describing the “effort to adapt private law
doctrines to the movement for economic growth.”).
215
See id. at 54, 58.
216
Strahilevitz, supra note 69 at 2157.
217
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 5 (“In practice [in landlord-tenant waste cases],
economic value tends to dominate everything else. If the economic value goes up, this
confirms what a normal owner would do and where the neighborhood is heading. If the
value goes down, the opposite inferences are drawn.”).
218
Strahilevitz, supra note 69.
219
HORWITZ, supra note 153 at 36.
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usage-veto natural-flow regime, which effectively prohibited substantial
water withdrawals. Courts instead adopted the market-facilitating doctrine
of reasonable-use, which allowed riparian property owners to withdraw
water for reasonable use on a riparian tract. 220 By removing downstream
owners’ power to veto new water uses and allowing riparian owners to
choose water uses based on market demand, the reasonable-use doctrine
prevented waste by eliminating some of the economically inefficient limits
on water diversion. 221
However, because the reasonable-use doctrine tied water-diversion
rights to riparian property, it proved ill suited for efficient development of
the arid western United States. 222 Thus, western states embraced the prior
appropriation doctrine, which ties water rights to water use rather than to
riparian land. Under the prior appropriation doctrine, one gains a water right
by diverting water and putting it to beneficial use. As a result, the doctrine
not only incentivizes development of water uses but also facilitates
economic efficiency because water can be used where it is most valued,
regardless of whether that is on a riparian tract or not. Moreover, the prior
appropriation doctrine makes explicit its underlying utilitarian value
structure by labeling unused water as “wasted.” 223
The development of oil and gas law also demonstrates an evolution
of market-facilitating measures. As discussed above, potential liability
under the ad coelum doctrine initially limited exploitation of oil and gas
resources. In response, states universally moved to encourage oil and gas
extraction by adopting the rule of capture, which limited ad coelum
220

See, e.g., Mark S. Davis & Michael Pappas, Escaping the Sporhase Maze:
Protecting State Waters Within the Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REV. 175, 184-85 (2012)
(“Eastern riparian regimes . . . focus on maintaining water in watercourses and sharing in
times of shortage. Riparian water rights stem not from diversion, but rather from ownership
of a tract of land that abuts or contains a watercourse (i.e., a riparian tract). A riparian
landowner traditionally has the right to make reasonable use of water on the riparian tract
or within a prescribed distance from the watercourse so that return flows will ensure
sufficient water for downstream users. In times of drought, all riparians share the burden of
shortage; earlier users receive no favored status.”).
221
See HORWITZ, supra note 153 37; Joseph Sax, Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium
on Managing Hawai’i’s Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 21, 25-28 (2001).
222
See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 231-35 (1992). The reasonable use doctrine restricted the
use of water to riparian tracts, and thus prevented the formation of markets for water use on
other tracts. Cf. id.
223
See, e.g.,62 Cal. Jur. 3d Water §§28-39 intro. (2005) (“The policy of the state courts
may be summarized to be that the rivers and streams of the state that waste into the sea
should, if possible, be conserved for beneficial uses, and that this should be done with full
recognition of the rights the riparian owners may properly assert.”) (emphasis added);
RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 747.
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liability. 224 Under the rule of capture, “the owner of a tract of land acquires
title to the oil and gas that is produced from wells drilled on the tract even if
it can be shown that the oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands.” 225 Thus,
the rule of capture responded to perceived under-use of oil and gas
resources by lowering the transaction costs of drilling.
This shift to the market-facilitating rule of capture certainly removed
impediments to drilling, but it proved an incomplete measure by creating
other economic inefficiencies. Under the rule of capture, the only option to
protect one’s oil and gas from being drained by a neighbor was to drill
one’s own well and intercept the oil and gas. 226 This incentive structure
essentially created a race to drill as many wells as close to property lines as
possible, both to protect one’s own reserves and to get any available share
of a neighbor’s. However, this caused two major problems: overdrilling—
too many wells drilled creating a higher capital cost than necessary to drain
the oil and gas reserve— and premature dissipation of the natural reservoir
energy—that is, dissipation of the pressure that would naturally push the oil
and gas up the wellhead. 227 This incentive to drill also flooded the market,
causing a distortion by increasing supply and thereby depressing prices. In
economic terms, these problems created deadweight losses and rent
erosion, 228 resulting in higher costs of production and inability to extract all
the available oil and gas from the reservoir. 229
In response to these new inefficiencies, the economically oriented
market-facilitating measures adjusted. States adopted conservation
regulations that imposed well-spacing requirements, limiting the number of
wells over a reservoir and thereby preventing overdrilling and premature
dissipation of reservoir energy. Additionally, states imposed “production
allowables” to limit oil and gas production and prevent the “economic
waste” that had resulted from the low prices of flooded markets. 230 These
regulations still promoted oil and gas development, but by reducing
224

KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 166 at 3.02.
Id.
226
See 1-2 The Law of Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition Scope; 1-2 The Law of
Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition § 2.01
227
This is an example of rent erosion in which a lack of defined property rights led to
wasteful expenditures seeking to capture the value of oil and gas. Cf. IPPOLITO, supra note
34 at 136.
228
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
229
1-2 The Law of Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition § 2.02.
230
Cf. ASCHER, supra note 61 at 8 (“For resource extraction, the value of the resource
can be squandered by extracting and selling it at the wrong time (e.g. when the prices are
too low) or by extracting it with excessive losses (e.g. pumping oil out too rapidly leaves
more in the ground; reckless timber harvesting can cause great damage to other trees).
These are essentially conservation issues, assessed in terms of both getting the greatest
economic value out of the resource endowment . . . .”).
225
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deadweight losses, they remained true to the anti-waste value of economic
efficiency. 231
Oil and gas doctrines continued to evolve in pursuit of economicefficiency, as states imposed additional regulations to reduce transaction
costs associated with divided ownership of oil and gas reservoirs. Since
reservoir shapes do not necessarily track surface-property boundaries, often
a reservoir underlies multiple tracts. 232 In such cases, the most efficient way
to extract the oil and gas may involve well placement that does not
correspond with property lines but rather requires landowners to cooperate
in a single well or series of wells. 233 However, because transaction costs,
such as assembly problems or bilateral monopolies, 234 frequently prevented
economically-efficient cooperation in drilling efforts, 235 states enacted
compulsory pooling and compulsory unitization schemes that could force
separate landowners to cooperate. 236 These anti-waste schemes, which are
still in operation today, compromise owner autonomy to promote
economically efficient development of oil and gas resources. 237
C. Sustainability Measures
Finally, sustainability measures constitute a third type of anti-waste
laws, and they typically stem from a perceived resource context of concern
about over-use. Rather than serving a single primary societal value,
however, sustainability measures respond to a pluralist 238 set of values
including human flourishing, future generations, and ecology.
Informed by these values, sustainability measures fundamentally
differ from market-facilitating measures by identifying waste not according
to economic-efficiency metrics but rather in terms of retaining options for
immediate and future human and ecological needs. Moreover, sustainability
measures differ from usage-veto measures because rather than seeking to
231

Id.
See generally 1-3 The Law of Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition § 3.02
233
See generally 1-3 The Law of Pooling and Unitization, 3rd Edition § 3.02
234
See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 39.
235
See Michael Pappas, Energy Versus Property, 40 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (describing how tract owners do not cooperate in pooling even when it is in their
economic best interests).
236
Pooling and unitization could also be voluntary. See id.
237
See Pappas, supra note 233 (discussing how these compulsory pooling and
unitization schemes compromise otherwise protected property rights in the name of driving
development of energy resources.).
238
See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 143 (“Pluralism in property theory eschews singular
narratives in understanding property law, focusing instead on the varied and often
competing normative and instrumental concerns embodied in the institution.”). See also
Hanoch Dagan, supra note 52; Purdy, supra note 6 at 655.
232
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preserve stability or continuity in resource uses, sustainability measures
may call for changes in settled resource uses to encourage immediate and
extended productivity. So, while sustainability measures and usage-veto
measures might both seek to avoid over-use, they differ in their underlying
conception of waste, and though both authority-default and sustainability
measures may sometimes lead to a form of resource preservation, their
different underlying values will frequently call for differing approaches to
resource management.
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) offers a prime example of a
sustainability measure aimed to protect against the waste of species and
biodiversity. Concerned with species extinction, a rather extreme form of
over-use, the ESA protects listed species by requiring that federal actions
not jeopardize continued species existence and by prohibiting all persons
from harassing, harming, killing, or otherwise “taking” these species. 239
Though these protections can be quite costly, in determining which species
are covered the ESA requires examination solely of biological risks to the
species, explicitly disallowing economic cost-benefit analysis. 240 Thus, the
ESA intentionally eschews economic-efficiency valuation based on
willingness to pay. 241 Instead it protects species based on ecological
concerns for biodiversity and ecosystem health as well as urgent humanflourishing and future-generations concerns, such as the possibility of
biodiversity providing a source for future medicines or helping contribute to
food security. 242
Other environmental statutes incorporate similar sustainability
measures that respond to ecosystem, human flourishing, and future
generations values rather than willingness to pay. For example, the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) 404(b) permit system limits wetland development in
order to achieve “no net loss” of wetlands function. 243 Thus it considers
wetlands loss a form of waste, even when markets may value other uses,
such as development, over wetlands conservation. 244 Driven by concerns
other than economic efficiency, the CWA preserves wetlands to provide for
current and future human flourishing needs, such as filtering contaminants
from water and reducing flood risks, 245 as well as ecological integrity. 246
239

See 16 U.S.C 1536, 1538.
See 16 U.S.C. 1533. Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 187.
241
See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 275-81 (1991).
242
Cf. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 330-332.
243
See 33 U.S.C. 1344; SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 210 at 270.
244
In fact, as discussed earlier, the development-driving Swampbusters program
subsidized the filling of wetlands to encourage higher-value land uses. See id.
245
See, e.g., id. at 269-70. These wetlands functions of filtering contaminants and
reducing flood risks can also be described as “ecosystem services.” See, e.g., James
Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN.
240
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In the same vein, the Magnuson-Stevens Act (“MSA”) manages
federal fisheries to provide “optimum yield” that will allow for continued
production of fisheries resources without depletion of wild fish stocks.247
The MSA also calls for fishing practices to avoid “bycatch,” the catch and
destruction of non-target species. 248 Both of these principles seek to avoid
wasting fisheries resources out of concern for both food availability, an
urgent need for current and future generations, and ecosystem function.
In the context of water law, the relatively recent development of instream flow provisions reflects another sustainability anti-waste measure.
Recognizing that excessive water diversions threatened the ecological
integrity of many watercourses, some states have enacted in-stream flow
laws requiring that a certain minimum amount of water remain in its natural
watercourse. Moreover, certain states even complement these minimum-instream flow provisions with laws allowing non-profit entities to hold
additional instream-flow rights for conservation purposes. These provisions
aim to prevent waste in the form of ecosystem destruction and its attendant
impacts on present and future generations. In doing so, these sustainability
measures respond to a concept of waste fundamentally different than that
underlying the market-facilitating prior-appropriations doctrine, which had
formerly condemned water flowing undiverted in a stream as waste. 249
Not all sustainability measures are of such recent vintage, however.
Decades before the enactment of most environmental statutes in the 1970s,
wildlife management laws employed sustainability anti-waste principles. 250
For example, both state and federal wild game laws sought to ensure stable
populations of game by setting hunting limits 251 and restricting markets for

ENVTL. L.J. 309, 310-312 (2001). Since these ecosystem services are essentially unpricedbenefits of natural environments, scholarship has explored methods for building markets
for ecosystem services. See, e.g., id. This approach obviously employs an economicefficiency value, and legal measures fostering ecosystem service markets could be seen as
market-facilitating anti-waste measures. However, the CWA currently does not take such
an approach, instead using a command-and-control restriction on wetlands development
that, as discussed above, reflects a sustainability measure.
246
See id. at 270.
247
See 16 U.S.C. 1851.
248
See 16 U.S.C. 1851.
249
See, e.g.,62 Cal. Jur. 3d Water §§28-39 intro. (2005) (“The policy of the state courts
may be summarized to be that the rivers and streams of the state that waste into the sea
should, if possible, be conserved for beneficial uses, and that this should be done with full
recognition of the rights the riparian owners may properly assert.”) (emphasis added);
RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 747.
250
See, e.g., The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. 703.
251
See, e.g., id.; http://mdc.mo.gov/hunting-trapping/deer-hunting/missouri-deerhunting-history
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the sale of game. 252 Additionally, federal and state laws expressly prohibit
“wanton waste” of game, 253 effectively codifying Locke’s disapproval of
killing an animal and leaving it to rot in the woods.
Earlier still, sustainability measures displaced markets to ensure that
important resources would be available for urgent needs. For example, “in
1817 the [federal] government had reserved for naval construction public
lands containing live oak and red cedar and in 1832 had reserved Hot
Springs, Arkansas because of its perceived medicinal value.” 254 Similarly,
resource concerns during World War II led to rationing regulations, which
sought to preserve resources for the war efforts and provide an equitable
distribution of consumer goods by curbing perceived wasteful non-urgent
consumption. 255
IV.

APPLYING THE WASTE FRAMEWORK

The previous Parts synthesized property and resource doctrines into
a framework for understanding legally cognizable waste concepts and antiwaste laws. As detailed above, legally cognizable waste arises through the
combination of perceived resource context and specific societal values, and
anti-waste provisions respond to legally cognizable waste through usageveto, market-facilitating, or sustainability measures. These consistent
responses show that anti-waste provisions are more than ad hoc, sui generis
resource laws; rather, across different time periods, resources, and
circumstances, legal conceptions of waste and anti-waste measures follow a
coherent framework.
This Part explores the practical and theoretical implications of the
252

See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 344-45.
See, e.g., 50 CFR 20.25. Though not all states use the term “wanton waste,” most
prohibit some variation of the concept.
254
See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 130.
These early sustainability measures are no longer in place, which helps
demonstrate that anti-waste measures do not necessarily follow a linear progression from
one to another. That is to say, not every usage-veto measure will eventually lead to a
sustainability measure, and sustainability measures are not necessarily the end-point of
some anti-waste arc. Rather, anti-waste measures shift in response to changing perceived
resource contexts and specific societal values. If a resource is not perceived to be over- or
under-used, then there is no longer a need for an anti-waste provision and it will be
abandoned, as were the provisions protecting the live oak and red ceder for naval
construction.
255
See ROBERT JAMES MADDOX, THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD WAR II, 193-194
(1992); Robert Higgs, The Two-Price System: U.S. Rationing During WWII, THE
FREEMAN, MAY, 2009; HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, OFF. OF TEMPORARY CONTROLS, OFF. OF
PRICE ADMIN., A SHORT HISTORY OF OPA 156 (1947); ARCHIE SATTERFIELD, THE HOME
FRONT: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE WAR YEARS IN AMERICA: 1941-45 208-209 (1981).
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waste framework. First, at a practical level, the framework offers a tool for
understanding and analyzing individual anti-waste measures. By identifying
the contexts and values that anti-waste provisions serve, the framework
establishes criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of any particular anti-waste
law. Second, on a more abstract level, the framework provides an
overarching appreciation of how waste concepts fit into broader property
principles and how anti-waste provisions work cumulatively to inject
adaptability into property law.
A. Analyzing Anti-Waste Provisions
Anti-waste provisions are only effective if they address current
instances of legally cognizable waste. Thus, anti-waste laws must respond
to changes in perceived resource contexts and societal values. 256 If antiwaste measures fall out of step with contexts or values, they may become
ineffectual or, worse yet, may cause legally cognizable waste rather than
prevent it. 257 As a result, it is essential to periodically reassess waste
conceptions and anti-waste provisions. 258 The waste framework offers a tool
for doing so, first by considering whether perceived resource context and
specific societal values have changed and second by considering whether
anti-waste measures have responded to these changes. The following
subsections offer examples of such analyses in light of current
circumstances.
1. Analyzing changes to percieved resource contexts and societal
values
Relatively recently, perceived resource contexts and societal values
may have shifted sufficiently to call into question the continued
applicability of many anti-waste measures.
In terms of perceived resource context, there is a growing perception
of limitation and over-use of many historically exploited resources, while at
the same time, alternative resources are perceived as under-used. For
instance, there has been an increased recognition of the limits of the finite
256

Cf. Freyfogle, supra note 22 (“the calculus of liberty could well change over time
as populations rise, resources decline, and public values evolve.”).
257
This was the case with the rule of capture leading to inefficient oil and gas
development See discussion supra.
258
Cf. Freyfogle, supra note 22 (“How private property's effects are evaluated overall-what is considered a cost, what a benefit, and how they all sum up--depends on the
surrounding society, with its circumstances, values, and hopes. Change the society, change
the circumstances and values, and a property system that once made sense might no longer
do so.”).
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resources of our world. In terms of traditionally exploited water, land, fossil
fuel, and wildlife resources, “[t]he nineteenth century vision of endless
abundance faded long ago.” 259 On top of that, climate change will likely
impose further strains on these resources, as dry areas are expected to get
drier, 260 sea level rise will present additional challenges in conserving
coastal wetlands, 261 and temperature changes will threaten the survival of
more species. 262 Moreover, appreciation has grown for how these historic
resources impact each other, such as the link between oil and gas
exploitation and habitat destruction 263 or the challenges of balancing water
use and energy production. 264 These examples are among the evidence of an
increasing perception that traditionally exploited resources are being overused.
While these traditionally harnessed resources are increasingly
perceived as over-used, there is also increased awareness of resources and
opportunities that are under-used. Renewable energy is a prime example,
and while development of renewable resources certainly impacts other
resource use, 265 the widely held and increasing perception is that renewable
energy is under-developed. 266 Similarly, energy efficiency, for example the
concept of the nega-watt, 267 and water re-use or increased water
efficiency 268 are resource deployments with perceived room to grow.
In conjunction with this change in perceived resource context, there
is also evidence of a shift in values, including greater appreciation for
human flourishing, future generations, and ecological concerns. For
example, the rising recognition of ecosystem services 269 embraces not only
259

Sprankling, supra note 184 at 857-58.
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of
State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 785-86 (2010) (discussing
climate change impacts on water resources).
261
See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea Level Rise, Property Rights,
and Time, 73 LA. L. REV 69, 70-71 (2012).
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See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54 at 325.
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See, e.g., New Study Estimates Impacts of Oil and Gas Development on Sagegrouse
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Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STANFORD ENVTL. L.J. 241, 253
(2011).
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ecological values but also the urgent human needs served by healthy
ecosystems that, for example, provide flood control, productive soil, and
beneficial pollinating insects. 270 Moreover, growing awareness of
environmental justice shows a focus on both ecological and human
flourishing values. 271 John Sprankling has described a similar shift in terms
of attitudes toward wilderness:
Two centuries of development have radically transformed our
national attitude toward wilderness. For the pioneer, an ancient forest on
future farmland had a negative value; it was an obstacle to be conquered
before cultivation could begin. Wilderness preservation in such circumstances
would have been economic and social heresy. Today, in contrast, our society
values wilderness for both moral and utilitarian reasons. 272

Though focused on wilderness, Sprankling’s observation is generalizable in
terms of how societal values regarding resources have become more
pluralist and diversified. 273
2. Analyzing particular anti-waste measures
If resource levels have changed, societal values have changed, and
the climate is changing, then anti-waste measures too are due for a change.
This section examines a selection of anti-waste measures for responsiveness
to possible changes in perceived resource contexts and societal values. The
few examples considered below are far from exhaustive, but they provide
generalizable models of analysis for re-evaluating other anti-waste laws.
First, market-facilitating measures can become outdated when they
continue to govern resources that are no longer perceived to be under-used
or for which the primary societal value is not limited to economic-efficiency
concerns. For example, the market-facilitating adverse possession doctrine
is no longer appropriate for wild lands because “[t]he need to encourage
wilderness development . . . no longer exists in the United States.”274
Nonetheless, “[t]oday, despite a fundamentally different national landscape,
Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 310-312 (2001).
270
See id.
271
See, e.g., Environmental Justice http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/index.html
272
Sprankling, supra note 18 at 584-85.
273
See id. at 584-85.
274
See id. See also Katz, supra note 254 (“Others point out that it is no longer selfevident that adverse possession leads to more efficient uses of land because our society no
longer straightforwardly prefers development and active uses of land over conservation and
passive uses. Not being able to locate the benefits of adverse possession for deliberate
squatters in utilitarian terms, American courts and commentators have become increasingly
responsive to what they see as the moral paradox of adverse possession.”).
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the property-law system still actively facilitates the despoliation of our
scattered wilderness remnants.” 275 Thus, because wild lands are no longer
perceived to be under-used, a market-facilitating approach is no longer
necessary. Additionally, societal values in wild lands appear to include
more concerns than just economic efficiency. 276 Accordingly, the answer is
to eschew the market-facilitating approach to wild lands and shift instead to
a provision more consistent with current perceived resource contexts and
values. Thus, if wild lands are in fact thought to be over-used, then a
sustainability measure or a usage-veto measure 277 would be appropriate,
depending on the prevailing societal value. If instead the current perception
of wild lands is neither over- nor under-use but rather satisfactory use, then
no anti-waste measure would be necessary.
Market-facilitating measures may also become outdated when they
fail to adjust themselves to address economic inefficiencies, such as
unpriced externalities, in resource uses. 278 In such instances, marketfacilitating approaches may still accurately reflect perceived resource underuse and prevailing economic efficiency values, but the particular measures
may need adjustment to address market failures. The current practice in oil
and gas extraction shows how the market-facilitating measures promoting
oil and gas development 279 have failed to account for economic waste
during resource extraction and thus need updating to ensure efficiency.
To take one example, hydraulic fracturing in North Dakota’s
Bakken Shale has produced an enormous amount of oil 280 and natural
gas. 281 However, rather than capturing the natural gas, which requires
paying for pipelines and processing plants, extractors opt for the cheaper
solution of simply burning the gas through “flaring.” 282 This gets rid of the
natural gas and allows extractors to more cheaply capture the oil, which is
more valuable. 283 Flaring is essentially unregulated, and while it is less
275

Sprankling, supra note 18
See, e.g., id. (“This ‘development model’ is fundamentally antagonistic to the
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See discussion supra.
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September
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destructive than simply allowing the natural gas to escape into the
atmosphere, the process still emits 2 million tons of CO2 into the
atmosphere each year, or enough energy to heat 500,000 homes. 284 Outside
of North Dakota less than 1% of natural gas is flared off, but within the
state, 34% was flared in 2012, resulting in North Dakota’s greenhouse gas
emissions for flaring alone equaling those of 2.5 million cars. 285 Moreover,
in addition to the flaring on the Bakken Shale, natural gas wells throughout
the country simply leak large quantities of methane, a potent greenhouse
gas, into the environment. 286
This flaring and leaking of natural gas creates a form of waste that
anti-waste measures must adapt to address. Assuming that marketfacilitating measures are still appropriate for oil and gas resources (i.e.
assuming that oil and gas is still perceived as under-developed and societal
values regarding oil and gas still primarily reflect economic-efficiency
concerns), then the relevant waste to address is the unpriced externality
caused by flaring and leakage. 287 Currently oil and gas extractors do not pay
for the environmental costs that these practices cause, and as a result the
costs of producing oil and gas are artificially depressed. 288 As a result, the
oil and gas anti-waste measures do not serve their underlying economicefficiency values because they have not corrected this pricing failure in oil
284

See id.
See Stephen Mufson, In North Dakota, the gritty side of an oil boom, July 18, 2012,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-18/business/35488649_1_oil-boom-rigs-oilcompanies/4.
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See, e.g., Energwire, September 18, 2013 Methane-spewing “super-emitters” stay
out
of
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study’s
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http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2013/09/18/stories/1059987397 and on file with author
287
From the standpoint of a human flourishing value, there may also be waste in
flaring or leaking the gas instead of using it to heat 500,000 homes because the urgency of
providing heat is greater than the urgency of cheaply burning off gas. However, adopting
this human flourishing value would necessitate abandoning the development-driving
framework and possibly adopting a sustainability measure instead. If this humanflourishing concern is an accurate reflection of prevailing societal value, then oil and gas
anti-waste provisions would need to make such a shift.
However, if economic efficiency is still the primary societal value used to measure
waste of oil and gas resources (i.e. if development-driving measures are still appropriate),
then flaring gas rather than using it to heat homes is not necessarily wasteful. Assuming
that all costs have been internalized, if the opportunity cost in capturing and processing the
gas is greater than the benefit of flaring the gas and more quickly extracting the morevaluable oil, then it is economically efficient to flare the gas instead of heating homes with
it. Thus from an economic standpoint, there would not be waste. This same line of thinking
appears to animate the flaring practice on the Bakken shale; however, as discussed in the
main text above, not all costs have been internalized, so there is market inefficiency leading
to economic waste.
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See ASCHER, supra note 61 at 16.
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and gas extraction. The solution, then, is to adjust market-facilitating
measures to internalize the full costs of oil and gas production, just as
market-facilitating oil and gas doctrines corrected the market inefficiencies
initially caused by the rule of capture. 289
It is not only market-facilitating measures that require
reexamination, however; usage-veto provisions can also fall out of step with
perceived resource contexts and societal values. The no harm rule for water
law has been criticized in this regard. The rule currently protects stability
and continuity of water uses by preventing transfer of water rights or
changes in water uses that would harm downstream appropriators.
However, economic-efficiency based arguments for water markets contend
that the no harm rule ossifies current inefficient water uses at the expense of
conservation or reallocation of water. This debate amounts to a difference in
values regarding water: for those favoring continuity, particularly of
cultural identity for agricultural communities that use the water, the no
harm rule has appeal, whereas those in favor of an economic-efficiency
would prefer to see the no harm rule replaced with a market-facilitating
measure that encourages gainful trades of water. While it is beyond the
ambition of this Article to resolve whether actual societal values tip in favor
of preserving or repealing the no harm rule, the controversy underscores the
need to periodically reexamine anti-waste provisions, and this anti-waste
framework clarifies the scope of the debate.
Sustainability measures too require reexamination to ensure that
they still match perceived resource contexts and societal values. For
example, oak and cedar trees reserved for naval construction or the
resources subject to rationing during World War II no longer require
sustainability anti-waste protections because values have shifted or
perceived resource contexts ceases to cause concern with overuse. Some
scholars have suggested that modern sustainability measures, such as the
ESA, 290 should also give way and shift to embrace economic-efficiency
values. 291 Again, though this Article does not aspire to pass on the merits of
these proposals, it hopefully clarifies what is at stake by grounding them in
the context of the broader legal anti-waste structure.
289

See discussion supra.
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See generally Endangered Species Act,
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Finally, perceived resource context and societal values may call for
new anti-waste measures for resources that have previously been
unaddressed. To take one example, anti-waste measures appear appropriate
to encourage distributed generation renewable energy projects. 292
Distributed generation sources are on-site electrical generation facilities
linked closely with their ultimate uses; solar panels or windmills on urban
rooftops is a frequently-used example. 293 Since renewable-energy is largely
perceived as under-used and under developed, and since these distributed
generation projects can offer great societal advantages, 294 then failing to
develop these projects could constitute a form of waste under a variety of
values including economic efficiency, human flourishing, future
generations, and ecological concerns. 295 However, a market-facilitating
anti-waste structure appears most suited to the current condition of
distributed generation, particularly given the market failures that currently
stand in the way of distributed-generation development. 296 Thus, just as the
mill acts instituted a mechanism to increase water power production, a
development driving regime may be appropriate to combat the under-use of
distributed generation of renewable energy, 297 and like the prior
appropriation doctrine considered any undiverted water reaching the ocean
to be wasted, so might the law consider it wasteful to allow unused sunlight
to hit a rooftop.
B. Adaptability of Waste
In addition to offering a tool for analyzing individual anti-waste
doctrines, the waste framework provides broader insight regarding how
anti-waste provisions function collectively and cumulatively. This
perspective highlights waste’s role as an adaptable element in our property
system.
Legally cognizable waste responds to the inputs of perceived
resource context and specific societal values, and as these inputs change, so
do conceptions of waste and attendant anti-waste measures. The examples
discussed in Part III detailed how over time various different anti-waste
regimes might govern the same resource (as with landlord-tenant waste),
how a single resource (such as water) may have various aspects managed
292
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through different anti-waste measures and how some resources (such as
historic naval reserves of oak and cedar trees) may no longer require antiwaste provisions.
As a result of this variability, anti-waste measures are less
predictable than other property doctrines, which generally provide lasting,
stable 298 expectations. 299 This decreased predictability comes with a cost;
anti-waste measures can disturb reliance interests and expectations or even
shift entitlements altogether. 300 However, this variability also brings
benefits. While most property doctrines do not react nimbly to new or
changing resource scenarios, 301 relatively mercurial anti-waste provisions
are more responsive, shifting with context and values. Thus, it is
unsurprising that over the American legal experience, the core concepts of
property have not changed nearly as drastically as have conceptions of
waste and anti-waste measures. 302 By responding to changing contexts and
values, anti-waste measures inject property law with an element of
adaptability.
By considering legal waste holistically and revealing crosscutting
characteristics like adaptability, the waste framework provides a vantage for
assessing how waste informs other veins of property, environmental, and
natural resource law. For example, it contributes a new consideration to the
body of literature addressing how property rights develop and change over
time. 303 Similarly, since the adaptability of waste laws can shift property
expectations, the waste framework informs Fifth Amendment takings
scholarship. 304 A global understanding of waste also contributes to
298
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environmental and natural resources scholarship. For example, since
shifting anti-waste provisions illustrate “a management policy framework
every bit as dynamic as the [resources] it seeks to manage,” 305 the
adaptability of anti-waste links with concepts of “adaptive management” 306
of natural resources. Finally, the adaptability of anti-waste provisions
resonates with scholarship aimed at reconciling climate change adaptations
with property expectations. 307 Thus, the anti-waste framework offers a tool
for theoretical as well as practical analysis.
CONCLUSION
Anti-waste measures harness the contested concept of waste to
create adaptable laws that steer property uses. Despite the seemingly
disparate nature of individual anti-waste laws, they define waste according
to the common factors of perceived resource context and societal values.
Anti-waste laws then address waste through three distinct regimes: usage
vetoes, market-facilitating measures, and sustainability measures.
Understanding anti-waste laws in light of this framework allows for critical
evaluation of their practical effectiveness and theoretical implications.
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